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Abstract The model in this paper provides a complementary explanation
to the well-known IPO pricing puzzle. The model allows the
investor to make a decision on whether and when information
should be gathered, and allows a purchase decision based on the
information. With this investor’s decision-making process in
mind, ﬁrms price their IPOs to maximize their payoffs by trying
to avoid an IPO failure and by assessing the investor’s possible
post-search outcomes. While the model provides implications to
the general IPO puzzle, the results seem particularly relevant for
explaining the pricing of REIT IPOs, MLP IPOs, and mutual
fund IPOs. The model may also help explain why IPO
underpricing levels change over time and suggests that
underpricing levels might vary across industries.
One of the most puzzling and much studied empirical phenomena in the ﬁnance
literature is probably the disparity between the offering prices of initial public
offerings (IPOs) and their market clearance prices on the ﬁrst day of trading. It
is estimated that investors in the IPO market earn an average initial day return of
17.3% from the 7,597 IPOs issued during the 1975–2005 period.1 This positive
and signiﬁcant initial day return is consistent over sub-periods but seems to be
higher for more recent IPOs. This pricing puzzle is probably difﬁcult to explain
because the process involves several different types of agents with conﬂicting
interests and different information. In addition, complicated regulatory constraints
might also have made this problem more time- and location-speciﬁc.
While many theorists and empiricists have attempted to address this issue from
various facets, the most developed area so far is that linked to stories based on
asymmetric information between issuers and underwriters; between issuers and
investors; between underwriters and investors; and among underwriters,
uninformed investors, and informed investors. The main explanations using the
asymmetric information story include: (1) keeping uninformed investors in the
market, (2) encouraging information production and revelation, and (3) signaling
a ﬁrm’s quality.2 Other fruitful avenues that help explain the IPO puzzle include
legal liability, aftermarket trading activities (including price stabilization and
ﬂipping), investor sentiment, and investor behavior.3 However, Ritter and Welch482  Chan, Wang, and Yang
(2002) seem to convincingly conclude that asymmetric information cannot be the
primary driver of the many IPO phenomena documented in the literature. Recently,
more emphasis seems to be placed on the darker side of the issues that are related
to agency problems between underwriters and issuers, allocation strategies used
by underwriters, and the possibility that IPO investors are deceived by analysts’
aggressive growth forecasts.4
It might be fair to say that while most of the theories developed so far have
received some empirical support (at varied levels), none of them seem to be able
to fully justify the pricing phenomenon. Furthermore, some of the empirical
evidence on IPOs cannot be adequately explained by any of the existing theories.
For example, none of the existing theories can fully explain why Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs were overpriced during the 1971–1988 period (and
slightly underpriced in the 1990–2000 period) and why Master Limited
Partnership (MLP) and mutual fund IPOs are not underpriced.5 In addition, the
large magnitude of the underpricing of high technology stock IPOs seems difﬁcult
to justify using rational explanations.
Among all the agents (owners of the ﬁrm, executives of the ﬁrm, underwriters,
informed investors, and uninformed investors) involved in the IPO market, the
least examined agent is probably the issuer (owner of the ﬁrm). Baron (1982) ﬁrst
argues that underpricing could be due to the information asymmetry between the
underwriter and the ﬁrm. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) demonstrate that underwriters underprice their
own IPOs as much as other IPOs in the market, while Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2003) report a negative relationship between the initial day return and the
investment bank’s equity holding. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and
Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), and Welch
(1996) establish a convincing literature suggesting that issuers are willing to burn
money in the IPO market in order to signal their quality. More recent research on
issuer’s behavior is done by Loughran and Ritter (2002). The authors predict that
issuers will care less about the offering price of an IPO (and hence not negotiate
aggressively with their underwriters) if they expect their stocks to perform well
in the aftermarket.
In this paper, we examine the IPO pricing strategies of issuing ﬁrms to shed light
on the underpricing issue. The intuition of our model is simple and is similar to
that of a traveler driving along a country road in the evening looking for a hotel
to stay for the night. The traveler knows there are two hotels available. One hotel
is about ﬁve miles away on the left side of the road while the other is about ﬁve
miles away on the right side of the road. The traveler has general knowledge about
the quality and the price range of the hotels from reading a travel guide, but does
not know which hotel provides a better deal. To make a decision, the traveler
randomly selects a hotel and invests time (and driving effort) to inspect the hotel.
After inspecting the ﬁrst hotel, the traveler will judge if its price is reasonable.
She will stay at the hotel if she deems that its price conforms to her expectation.
However, if she judges the ﬁrst hotel’s price to be too high given its quality, sheIPO Pricing Strategies  483
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will have an incentive to drive to the second hotel to check it out. If she decides
to drive away, she will have to invest more time (and driving effort). Apparently,
there is an incentive for her not to drive away given this additional cost. If, after
inspecting the second hotel, she still judges its price to be too high given its
quality, she will have to incur further costs to ﬁnd other alternatives. Thus, the
trade-off for the traveler is between incurring more search costs and taking the
current offer.
Both hotel owners are aware of the traveler’s decision-making process but do not
know which hotel the traveler will visit ﬁrst. The owner of the hotel ﬁrst visited
by the traveler knows that, if the traveler leaves and then ﬁnds the price of the
second hotel to be more attractive, he will lose the traveler. But, if the traveler
also ﬁnds the price offered by the second hotel owner to be too high, the individual
will either return to the ﬁrst hotel or seek other alternatives. Both owners, realizing
the possibility that the room will not be sold if they lose the traveler, have an
incentive to lower the room rate to a level that they believe the traveler will accept.
Given this process, the pricing decision of each hotel owner involves three
parameters. The ﬁrst is the cost for the traveler to search and inspect another
alternative (to drive away). The higher the traveler’s search cost, the lower the
owner’s incentive to reduce rates. The second is the owner’s loss of revenue
(deadweight costs) if the traveler leaves. Of course, the higher the deadweight
loss, the higher the owner’s incentive to lower rates. The last parameter is the
range of room rates from which a traveler might draw. Depending on the traveler’s
background and prior experience, the room rate that is deemed reasonable may
vary among travelers. If the hotel owner believes that the rate the traveler ﬁnds
acceptable comes from a wide range, then the owner has an incentive to set a
high rate. This is the case because, holding everything else constant, the
probability for the traveler to leave when offered a high rate is lower when the
range is wider. Given this, an owner of a resort hotel may have less incentive to
lower the rates (since the rates deemed reasonable by travelers could vary
signiﬁcantly) when compared to an owner of a standard hotel (for which travelers
may have a better consensus of opinion on an acceptable rate).
The IPO issuing ﬁrms may follow a similar logic in their pricing decisions. Our
model includes two ﬁrms issuing IPOs simultaneously and one representative
investor. The two ﬁrms will announce their IPO prices and the investor will do
the research. After obtaining information on the ﬁrst issuing ﬁrm that the investor
randomly picks, the investor will decide whether to purchase its stock or to
research another ﬁrm. If the investor decides to do the latter, additional costs will
be incurred. If, after the second search the investor still thinks that the prices of
both offering ﬁrms are too high, other investment opportunities will be
investigated. For the issuing ﬁrms, we assume there is a deadweight cost (in the
form of reputation loss and issuance cost) if the issuance fails. On the other hand,
the investor may have an incentive to purchase the stock of the ﬁrst ﬁrm as
additional searches will involve additional costs. Given this arrangement, ﬁrms
have an incentive to price high if the investor’s search cost is high, to price low484  Chan, Wang, and Yang
if the cost of a failed issuance is high, and to price high if the chance for an
investor to come up with a high value is high. Therefore, depending on the
parameter values, we could observe an overpricing of IPOs, a slight underpricing
of IPOs, or a signiﬁcant underpricing of IPOs.
One of the unique features of our model is that we do not need to assume one
agent has superior information over others. We allow the agents to act based on
the information they gather (some with a search cost), even if that information
may differ among the agents. This information structure differs from most (if not
all) information structures that have been used to explain IPO pricing (or
allocation) strategies. With this information structure, we are able to provide a
complementary explanation to the other existing theoretical frameworks. While
we believe that our model predictions have general implications to the observed
IPO pricing puzzle, the results are particularly helpful in explaining why REIT
IPOs can be overpriced, and why MLP IPOs and mutual fund IPOs are not under-
or over-priced. Furthermore, our model may help offer a partial explanation for
the signiﬁcant underpricing of IPOs during hot markets.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents the basic model. In that
section, we only model the interaction between issuers (the ﬁrms) and the investor.
The underwriter does not play a role. To some extent, we are modeling a best-
efforts contract. In section three, we expand the model by bringing the underwriter
into the picture and discussing a ﬁrm’s pricing strategy under a ﬁrm commitment
contract. The section also discusses the factors affecting the optimal contract
choice. Section four contains our conclusions.
 The Basic Model
We assume there is a representative investor, symbolized as I, who is looking for
an investment opportunity in the IPO market. Meanwhile, there are two ﬁrms, Fi
and Fj. Each of these two ﬁrms offer one share of IPO stock for sale, and their
intrinsic values are Vi and Vj, respectively.6 We assume that the ﬁrms are
symmetric in their pricing decisions and do not play games with each other. In
this regard, if the ﬁrms have identical intrinsic values, their pricing decisions will
be the same. We also assume that each ﬁrm can estimate the intrinsic values of
both its own stock and its rival’s stock, Vi and Vj.7 The investor, on the other hand,
is unable to know with certainty the intrinsic values that the ﬁrms assign to their
stocks. However, there is public information on these ﬁrms prior to the investor’s
search that the stock value of ﬁrm Fx(x  i, j) follows a uniform distribution, or,
Vbx  U[  ,  ], with a mean and a variance 2. We assume that the 1 – VV V xx x 3
information on and  is publicly available to both the investor and the two Vx
ﬁrms.
We use a three-stage model to illustrate the search process used by the investor
and the pricing strategy adopted by the ﬁrm. At stage one, each ﬁrm makes an
offer to the market at prices pi and pj, respectively.8 At stage two, after observingIPO Pricing Strategies  485
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the IPO prices, the investor randomly selects a ﬁrm (namely, the ﬁrst ﬁrm) to
determine the price for the ﬁrm’s stock. Here, we assume that the investor does
not make a completely uninformed investment decision but will conduct a search
on at least the ﬁrst target ﬁrm.9 This investigation will incur search costs c1,b u t
will reﬁne the investor’s information about the ﬁrm and generate a post-search
stock value (x  i, j). The investor will then make a purchase decision based ˆ Vx
on this realized value . ˆ Vx
The ﬁrms, on the other hand, are unable to observe the investor’s post-search
value but they know that follows a uniform distribution  around the ˆˆ VV xx
intrinsic value Vx on a narrow support [Vx  a, Vx  a], where Vx is the mean
and a  0 measures the deviation of from Vx. Since the search will reﬁne the ˆ Vx
investor’s information, we implicitly assume (Vx  a)  (Vx  a)  )  (Vx
 ), that is, a  .10 This means that before the search, the ﬁrm knows the (Vx
distribution [Vx  a, Vx  a] from which the investor will draw for the search,
but is unable to observe the investor’s post-search value . Given this, a ﬁrm’s ˆ Vx
pricing decision can only be based on its estimate of the range [Vx  a, Vx  a],
while the investor’s purchase decision is based on the realized post-search value
from the ﬁrst search. ˆ Vx
After the search, the game reaches the third stage. At this stage, if we assume
that the ﬁrst ﬁrm being searched is Fi, the investor will then make a decision
based on the search result . The investor faces three choices according to the ˆ Vi
realized . First, if is high enough (in relation to pi, pj, expected , and future ˆˆ ˆ VV V ii j
search costs), the investor will accept this ﬁrm’s offer immediately and not conduct
the second search. When this happens, the game stops. Second, if the realized
is not high enough while the second offer pj is sufﬁciently attractive (in relation ˆ Vi
to pi, future search costs, and expected ), the investor will conduct a second ˆ Vj
search for the value of the second ﬁrm (thus incurring a second search cost c2),
and then decide to either accept pi or pj, or reject both offers. If the investor
decides to reject both offers, we assume that the investor will incur future search
costs c3 to investigate another investment opportunity.11 Third, if the realized ˆ Vi
after the ﬁrst search is not high enough while the second offer pj is not attractive
either (in relation to pi, c2, c3, and expected ), the investor will reject both offers ˆ Vj
immediately after the ﬁrst search. This, again, will incur future search costs c3 for
the investor. We assume there is a learning factor   [0, 1] such that c2  c1
and c3  2c1.I f is small, the information gathered in this search will be more
helpful to the investor in the next search, and the search costs decrease more
quickly over time.12 Given this, although the investor has an incentive to minimize
the total search costs (by searching fewer ﬁrms), the impact of search costs will
be reduced if there is a strong learning effect.
Both ﬁrms are aware of the investor’s strategy and the information set the investor
possesses. The only thing the ﬁrms do not know (but the investor will know if
when a search is conducted) is the realized value from the search, (x  i, j). ˆ Vx
However, the ﬁrms know that this realized value will be drawn from a distribution
[Vx  a, Vx  a] and they will price their IPOs according to this distribution486  Chan, Wang, and Yang
with the investor’s strategy in mind. We assume that there are costs for a ﬁrm to
issue an IPO. If an IPO fails, the ﬁrm will incur deadweight costs Vx  Wx (such
as the loss of reputation, a signal that the ﬁrm’s assets are not attractive, the loss
of issuance expenses, and the inability to be traded in the stock markets), where
Wx is the value of the ﬁrm if the issue fails.13 Given this, holding everything else
constant, the ﬁrm has an incentive to adopt a pricing strategy that will minimize
the possibility of incurring the deadweight costs.
Exhibit 1 illustrates the investor’s search strategy and the ﬁrms’ pricing decisions.
In the following sub-sections, we will ﬁrst model the interactions between the
investor and the two ﬁrms. In other words, we will model a best-efforts contract
where underwriters do not play a role. In section three, we will incorporate the
underwriter into the model and explicitly discuss the contract choice between ﬁrm
commitment and best efforts for the IPO ﬁrms.
Decision Rules and Payoffs
As shown in Exhibit 1, after the ﬁrms announce their IPO prices, there are 10
possible outcomes (which we term terminal nodes) depending on the actions the
investor will take. After observing the prices, the investor will ﬁrst randomly select
a ﬁrm (either Fi or Fj) to investigate its stock value. If Fi is selected (with a 50%
probability), there are ﬁve possible outcomes (or terminal nodes). Exhibit 2
summarizes the results.
As Exhibit 2 shows, the ﬁrst terminal node is NAi. This happens when, after the
ﬁrst search, the investor decides to purchase the stock of Fi without conducting a
second search. The payoff vector (for investor, Fi, Fj) of this node is (Vi  pi 
c1, pi, Vj). This means that the investor pays pi and the ﬁrst search cost c1 to get
a stock with an intrinsic value Vi. Firm Fi sells its stock at pi, while Fj keeps its
stock. Since the IPO is not a failure and can be considered by other investors in
the future, Fj retains its original intrinsic value Vj.
The second terminal node is NOi. This happens when, after the ﬁrst search, the
investor decides neither to purchase the stock of Fi nor to purchase the stock of
Fj (and will not conduct the second search). The payoff vector of this node is
(c1  c3, Wi, Vj).14 This means that the investor pays the ﬁrst search cost c1 and
the third search costs for other alternatives. Since Fi has been searched, but has
not sold its stock (hence the IPO fails), the ﬁrm incurs deadweight costs (Vi 
Wi) with its stock value dropping to Wi. Since Fj has not been searched and can
be considered by other investors in the future, Fj retains its original intrinsic value
Vj.
The last three terminal nodes are SAi, SRi, and SOi. They are the three options
that the investor faces when conducting a second search for the stock value of Fj
(and, hence, incurring the search cost c2). After the second search, if the investor
decides to buy the stock of Fi, the game will end at terminal node SAi with a
payoff vector (Vi  pi  c1  c2, pi, Wj). This means that the investor pays pi andIPO Pricing Strategies  487
JRER  Vol. 31  N o . 4–2 0 0 9
Exhibit 1  Model Framework
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Firm Fi and ﬁrm Fj issue IPOs at prices pi and pj, respectively. Observing the prices, the investor randomly picks
a ﬁrm and searches for its intrinsic value at a cost c1. The game proceeds on the left branch if Fi is picked.
Observing Fi’s post-search value, the investor decides to (1) accept pi immediately (which ends the game at NAi),
(2) reject both pi and pj immediately and incur costs c3 to search for future investment opportunities (which ends
the game at NOi), or (3) search Fj’s value at a cost c2. If the investor continues the search, the investor will decide
to (1) accept pi, (2) accept pj, or (3) reject both (which again costs c3 to search for future investment opportunities).
This will end the game at SAi, SRi, SOi, respectively. The game proceeds on the right branch if Fj is picked ﬁrst.
When this happens, the game ends at NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj,o rSOj. Note that the search costs are correlated with
a learning factor   [0, 1], where c2  c1 and c3  c2  2c1. The payoffs to the relevant parties at each
terminal node are described in Exhibit 2.488  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Exhibit 2  Outcomes and Payoffs
Terminal
Node Investor’s Choices Payoffs (I , i, j)
NAi Accept pi immediately after 1st search (on Vi)( Vi  pi  c1, pi, Vj)
NOi Reject pi and pj immediately after 1st search (on Vi)( c1  c3, Wi, Vj)
SAi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then accept pi (Vi  pi  c1  c2, pi, Wj)
SRi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then accept pj (Vj  pj  c1  c2, Wi, pj)
SOi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then reject both (c1  c2  c3, Wi, Wj)
NAj Accept pj immediately after 1st search (on Vj)( Vj  pj  c1, Vi, pj)
NOj Reject pi and pj immediately after 1st search (on Vj)( c1  c3, Vi, Wj)
SAj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then accept pi (Vi  pi  c1  c2, pi, Wj)
SRj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then accept pj (Vj  pj  c1  c2, Wi, pj)
SOj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then reject both (c1  c2  c3, Wi, Wj)
Notes: This table summarizes all the possible outcomes and the corresponding payoffs for the
investor and the ﬁrms. NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi, SOi, NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj,a n dSOj are the indexes for
outcomes (see Exhibit 1), each matched with a set of the investor’s choices. pi and pj are the two
IPO prices. I, i and j denote the payoffs to the investor, ﬁrm Fi and ﬁrm Fj, respectively. Wi
and Wj are the two ﬁrms’ payoffs if their IPOs do not sell out at the offer prices. c1, c2,a n dc3 are
the investor’s search costs for the ﬁrst stock value, the second stock value, and further investment
opportunities, respectively.
two search costs (c1 and c2) to get a stock with an intrinsic value Vi. Firm Fj fails
to sell its stock at pj, incurs a deadweight loss, Vj  Wj, and its stock value drops
to Wj. Firm Fi, on the other hand, sells its stock and receives a payoff pi.
If, however, the investor decides to buy the stock of Fj after the second search,
the game will end at terminal node SRi with a payoff vector (Vj  pj  c1  c2,
Wi, pj). In this case, the investor pays pj and two search costs (c1 and c2) to get a
stock with an intrinsic value Vj. Firm Fi fails to sell its stock at pi and incurs a
deadweight loss Vi  Wi (with its stock value dropping to Wi), while ﬁrm Fj sells
its stock and receives a payoff pj.
Lastly, if after the second search the investor decides not to buy any stock, the
game will end at terminal node SOi. Under this circumstance, the payoff vector
for the investor, and ﬁrms Fi and Fj,i s( c1  c2  c3, Wi, Wj). The payoff to
the investor is c1  c2  c3 because the investor does not purchase any of the
two stocks and will incur further search costs for her future investment. Since we
assume that there are deadweight costs Vi  Wi when an IPO fails, if both Fi and
Fj fail to sell their stocks, the values of the ﬁrms’ stocks drop to Wi and Wj,
respectively.IPO Pricing Strategies  489
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If, at the beginning of the game, the investor randomly selects to search Fj (instead
of Fi), there will also be ﬁve terminal nodes (NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj, and SOj). As
Exhibit 2 shows, the payoffs of these ﬁve terminal nodes correspond to that of
NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi, and SOi. This is true because the decision rules are the same
under both circumstances with the only difference being that Fj (instead of Fi)i s
searched ﬁrst. Given this, the payoffs of NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj, and SOj simply mirror
the payoffs of NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi, and SOi, and we only need to switch the payoffs
between Fi and Fj.
Exhibit 2 summarizes the details on the payoffs to the three players (investor, ﬁrm
Fi, and ﬁrm Fj) at each of the 10 terminal nodes. After observing the prices (pi
and pj) offered by the two ﬁrms, the investor will make an optimal decision based
on these 10 possible payoffs. In other words, given the prices offered by the ﬁrms,
the magnitudes of the search costs (c1, c2, and c3) and the deadweight costs, the
investor will select one of the 10 terminal nodes to maximize the payoff. With
backward induction, the ﬁrms understand the investor’s decision rule and will set
a corresponding price level that maximizes their payoffs. The next two sub-
sections discuss the maximization problems of the investor and the ﬁrms.
The Investor’s Optimization Decision
As assumed earlier, there is a 50% probability for each ﬁrm to be searched ﬁrst.
After the ﬁrst search, the investor obtains a realized . Knowing pi, pj, realized ˆ Vi
, and the expected (not realized) value of , the investor chooses to either (1) ˆˆ VV ij
immediately accept pi (NAi), (2) to immediately reject both pi and pj (NOi), or (3)
to conduct a second search. If there is a second search, the investor will know pi,
pj, realized , and realized after this search. The investor will then choose to ˆˆ VV ij
either (1) accept pi,( SAi), (2) accept pj,( SRi), or (3) reject both pi and pj (SOi).
As deﬁned earlier, before the ﬁrst search the investor estimates that the value of
the stock Vbi follows a uniform distribution U[  ,  ]. We also assume VV ii
that the ﬁrms estimate that the post-search perceived stock value follows a ˆ Vi
uniform distribution U[Vi  a, Vi  a]. Consistent with the discussions earlier,
we have a  .
The investor’s optimization problem can be solved with backward deduction,
starting with comparing nodes SAi, SRi, and SOi given that the investor proceeded
with the second search, and then comparing nodes NAi, NOi and the choice of
conducting the second search. Lemma 1 reports the investor’s optimal decisions
and Exhibit 3 summarizes the results.
Lemma 1. With two ﬁrms Fi and Fj simultaneously offering IPOs at prices pi and
pj, respectively, the investor’s decision rules after searching the ﬁrst ﬁrm Fi’s stock
value are:
[1] If  pi  c3 and  pi     pj  immediately ˆˆ VV V 2c , ii j 2





















Exhibit 3  Investor’s Decision Rules







[1]  pi  c3 and  pi     pj  ˆˆ VV V 2c  ii j 2 No 2nd Search — NAi
[2]  pi  c3 and  pi    pj  ˆˆ VV V 2c  ii j 2 2nd Search  pi   pj ˆˆ VV ij
 pi  pj ˆˆ VV ij
SAi
SRi
[3]  pi  c3 and pj     c3 ˆ VV 2c  ij 2 No 2nd Search — NOi
[4]  pi  c3 and pj    c3 ˆ VV 2c  ij 2 2nd Search  pj  c3 ˆ Vj
 pj  c3 ˆ Vj
SRi
SOi
Notes: This table summarizes the investor’s decision rules. NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi,a n dSOi are the indexes for outcomes (see Exhibit 1); pi and pj are the two
IPO prices; and are the stock values perceived by the investor after her searches; c2 and c3 are the investor’s search costs for the second stock and ˆˆ VV ij
further investment opportunities, respectively; routes [1], [2], [3], and [4] are the four routes that an investor can take after the ﬁrst search: [1] accept the ﬁrst
offer without a second search, [2] conduct a second search and then decide to accept one offer, [3] reject both offers without a second search, or [4]
conduct a second search and then decide to either accept the second offer or reject both offers.IPO Pricing Strategies  491
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[2] If  pi  c3 and  pi    pj  conduct a second ˆˆ VV V 2c , ii j 2
search, then purchase the stock of ﬁrm Fi at pi if  pi   pj or ˆˆ VV ij
purchase the stock of ﬁrm Fj at pj if  pi  pj; ˆˆ VV ij
[3] If  pi  c3 and pj     c3, immediately reject ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
both offers at pi and pj;
[4] If  pi  c3 and pj    c3, conduct a second ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
search, then purchase the stock of ﬁrm Fj at pj if  pj  c3, or reject ˆ Vj
both offers at pi and pj if  pj  c3. ˆ Vj
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 indicates that the investor’s ﬁrst decision is to compare the magnitudes
of  pi and c3. This is true because if the investor decides not to purchase ˆ Vi
one of the two stocks, a third search cost will be incurred, c3, for future investment
opportunities. Given this, the investor is better off by purchasing a stock (Fi or
Fj) as long as the difference between the value and the price of the ﬁrst searched
stock (  pi) is higher than c3. This condition leads to routes [1] and [2] ˆ Vi
identiﬁed by Lemma 1. Under this condition (to purchase at least one stock), if
the price of the other stock pj, the second search cost c2, and the pre-search price
range  are high enough (hence the magnitude of pj  is large enough), 2c  2
the investor will stop searching and purchase the ﬁrst stock. This will lead to route
[1] and the investor’s payoff is terminal node NA (  pi  c1). On the other ˆ Vi
hand, if the price of the other stock pj, the second search cost c2, and the pre-
search information uncertainty  are low enough (hence the magnitude of pj 
is small enough), then the investor will have an incentive to conduct a 2c  2
second search for the value of the other stock. After the second search, the investor
will purchase the stock with a higher value (that is, the larger of the difference
between  pi and  pj). With this second search, the investor will take route ˆˆ VV ij
[2] identiﬁed in Lemma 1, with a payoff terminal node SA or SR (  pi  c1  ˆ Vi
c2 or  pj  c1  c2). ˆ Vj
When the difference between the value identiﬁed by the investor and the price of
the ﬁrst stock searched (  pi) is lower than c3, the investor will immediately ˆ Vi
decide not to purchase this particular stock under any circumstance. The investor
will not conduct a second search if the price of the other stock is also too high
(higher than the upper boundary of the estimated intrinsic value of the stock and
the third search cost, or pj     c3).15 If the investor decides not V 2c  j 2
to conduct a second search at this stage, no stock will be purchased and the
investor will wait for future investment opportunities. Consequently, the investor
will take route [3] and end up at terminal node NO with a payoff c3  c1.
However, if the offering price of the other stock is not extremely high (pj  Vj
  c3), the investor will conduct a second search. This will lead to 2c  2
route [4]. If the realized value of the second ﬁrm’s stock as relative to its offering
price is sufﬁciently high (  pj  c3), the investor will purchase the stock of ˆ Vj
the second ﬁrm and end up at terminal node SR with a payoff  pj  c1  c2. ˆ Vj
Alternatively, if the realized value of the second ﬁrm’s stock as relative to its492  Chan, Wang, and Yang
offering price is sufﬁciently low (  pj  c3), the investor will not purchase ˆ Vj
any stock at this stage, ending up at terminal node SO with a payoff c1 
c2  c3.
Routes [1], [2], [3], and [4] represent all possible moves by the investor. Clearly,
the route the investor will select depends on the prices set by the ﬁrms (pi and
pj), the magnitudes of the search costs (c1, c2, c3), and the pre-search ﬁrm value
distribution parameters ( , ). As Exhibit 3 indicates, the investor will go along ˆ Vj
either route [1] or route [2] if she observes  pi  c3. The ﬁnal decision ˆ Vi
between these two routes is determined by the magnitudes of the prices pi and pj,
the post-search perceived ﬁrm value , the second search cost c2, and the upper ˆ Vi
boundary of the estimated intrinsic stock value  .I f  pi     ˆ VVV jij
pj  the investor will pass up the second search and accept pi immediately. 2c , 2
Note that holding , pj, and  constant, a lower pi or a higher c2 will make ˆ VV , ij
the ‘‘no second search’’ route more likely. In this sense, there is an incentive for
a ﬁrm to lower its offering price to reduce the investor’s incentive to shop around.
The investor will go along either route [3] or route [4] if  pi  c3.I ft h e ˆ Vi
investor selects route [3] or route [4], a likely outcome is that the investor will
reject both offers. Given this, the investor may have an incentive to accept a higher
price if search costs are high.
The results derived in this section seem quite intuitive. If the price set by the ﬁrm
is too high or if search costs are too low, the investor will be more likely to
conduct another search for investment opportunities. If the investor does not
purchase the ﬁrm’s stock, the ﬁrm suffers because of the deadweight costs. Given
this, ﬁrms have incentives to price their stocks low enough to retain the investor.
On the other hand, if the search costs are high, the investor may have an incentive
to purchase the stock at a higher price to avoid the need for a further search.
The Firm’s Optimization Strategy
With the investor’s four routes (as summarized in Exhibit 3) in mind, a ﬁrm will
select an IPO price that maximizes the expected payoffs. Since there are four
possible investor decision rules, there will be four possible payoffs. Panel A of
Exhibit 4 reports the payoffs of ﬁrm Fi and ﬁrm Fj given the route selected by
the investor. (The payoffs of the ﬁrms are extracted from the last column of Exhibit
2 and are self explanatory.) To simplify our presentation, we deﬁne Ai  Vi  a,
Bi  pi  c3, Ci    pi  pj  Di  Vi  a, and     V 2c , V j 2 j
 c3. It should be noted that the magnitudes of Bi, Ci, and  decide the 2c  2
route the investor will take. Since the magnitudes of Bi and Ci are functions of
pi, the magnitude of pi (or the pricing strategy of the ﬁrms) will affect the
magnitudes of Bi and Ci (which affect the route the investor will take). The route
the investor takes will, in turn, decide the proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
Panel A of Exhibit 4 shows that the payoffs of routes [1] and [3] are deterministic
since there is no need to decide whether a second search is required. However,IPO Pricing Strategies  493
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Exhibit 4  Firms’ Payoffs















[1]  Bi and  Ci ˆˆ VV ii No 2nd
Search
— NAi pi Vj
[2]  Bi and  Ci ˆˆ VV ii 2nd
Search
  pi  pj ˆˆ VV ji







[3]  Bi and pj   ˆ Vi No 2nd
Search
— NOi Wi Vj
[4]  Bi and pj   ˆ Vi 2nd
Search
 pj  c3 ˆ Vj







Panel B: Firms’ expected payoffs when searched ﬁrst (or second)
Route
[k]
Firm Fi’s [k]  : iL
Expected Payoff if
Searched First
Firm Fi’s [k]  : iR
Expected Payoff if
Searched Second
Firm Fj’s [k]  : jL
Expected Payoff if
Searched Second
Firm Fj’s [k]  : jR
Expected Payoff if
Searched First
[1] pi Vi Vj pj
[2]
ˆ Vpp iij pi ˆ  dVj
Va 2a j

Va j Wi ˆ  dVj ˆ Vpp 2a iij
ˆ Vpp jji Wi ˆ  dVi
Va 2a i

Va i pi ˆ  dVi ˆ Vpp 2a jji
ˆ Vpp iij Wj ˆ  dVj
Va 2a j
Va j pj ˆ  dVj ˆ Vpp 2a iij
ˆ Vpp jji pj ˆ  dVi
Va 2a i

Va i Wj ˆ  dVi ˆ Vpp 2a jji
[3] Wi Vi Vj Wj
[4] Wi
pc i 3 Wi ˆ  dVi
Va 2a i
Va i pi ˆ  dVi
pc 2a i 3
pc j 3 Wj ˆ  dVj
Va 2a j
Va j pj ˆ  dVj
pc 2a j 3
Wj
Notes: This table summarizes ﬁrms’ payoffs that correspond to the investor’s decision. Panel A
shows the payoffs at each terminal node, while Panel B shows the expected payoffs on each
branch along each of the four routes. NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi, SOi, NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj,a n dSOj are
the indexes for outcomes (see Exhibit 1); pi and pj are the IPO prices; Vi and Vj are the intrinsic
stock values; and are the stock values perceived by the investor after her searches; Wi and ˆˆ VV ij
Wj are the ﬁrms’ payoffs if their IPOs cannot be sold at the initial offer prices; a is the post-search
information bias; c1, c2 and c3 are the investor’s search costs for the ﬁrst stock’s value, the second
stock’s value and further investment opportunities, respectively; Bi, Ci,a n d are abbreviations
with Bi  pi  c3, Ci    pi  pj  ,a n d    c3; [1], [2], V 2c  V 2c  j 2 j 2
[3], and [4] are the four routes that the investor can take after the ﬁrst search: [1] accept the ﬁrst
offer without a second search, [2] conduct a second search then decide to accept either the ﬁrst
offer or the second offer, [3] reject both offers without a second search, or [4] conduct a second
search and then decide to either accept the second offer or reject both offers.494  Chan, Wang, and Yang
the outcomes of routes [2] and [4] are stochastic since their payoffs depend on
whether the investor will conduct the second search. As mentioned earlier, the
investor will make this decision based on the post-search ﬁrm value (which the ˆ Vi
ﬁrm is unable to observe). Consequently, the expected payoffs of routes [2] and
[4] depend upon the distribution of  U[Vi  a, Vi  a] (on which the ﬁrm ˆ Vi
has information).
In addition, since a ﬁrm does not know if ﬁrm Fi or ﬁrm Fj will be searched ﬁrst
by the investor, the ﬁrm will have to estimate its payoffs under both circumstances.
Given this, if Fi is searched ﬁrst, the second column of Panel B reports the
expected payoffs of each route of Fi [deﬁned as where k  (1,2,3,4)]. If [k] E( ), iL
Fj is searched ﬁrst, the ﬁfth column of the same panel reports the expected payoffs
of each route of Fj [deﬁned as where k  (1,2,3,4)]. If Fi (or Fj)i s [k] E( ), jR
searched second, the third (or the fourth) columns of the same panel reports the
expected payoffs of each route of Fi [deﬁned as where k  (1,2,3,4)] or [k] E( ), iR
Fj [deﬁned as where k  (1,2,3,4)]. The detailed expected payoff of each [k] E( ), jL
route for each ﬁrm is reported in Panel B of the same table.
We can use to illustrate the concept. It is clear from the third row of [2] E( ) iL
column 4 in Panel A of Exhibit 4 that the ﬁrm will conduct a second search if
 Bi and  Ci. If the realized value is   pi  pj, then the ﬁrm’s ˆˆ ˆ ˆ VV V V ii j i
payoff is pi. If the realized value  pi  pj, then the ﬁrm’s payoff is Wi. ˆˆ VV ji
Given these, the expected payoff for Fi (when the investor takes route [2] and
when the ﬁrm is searched ﬁrst by the investor) is  pi/2a 
ˆ [2] V p p iij ˆ   dV iL V aj j
Wi/2a as reported in the third row of column 2 in Panel B of Exhibit
V a j ˆ  dV, ˆ j V p p iij
4.
From Panels A and B of Exhibit 4, it is clear that a ﬁrm’s payoff depends on the
route selected by the investor or on whether the ﬁrm was searched ﬁrst or not.
Since there are many possible routes and the pricing decisions of the ﬁrms affect
the route, it is not feasible for us to ﬁnd a global optimal pricing decision by
examining all routes in one equation. To handle this issue, we follow the
methodology employed by Lee (1994). In Lee’s paper, a seller’s expected payoff
function depends on the possible orders of a buyer’s decision boundaries. To
maximize the seller’s payoff, Lee solves for the optimal price that maximizes a
seller’s expected payoff function that matches each possible boundary order and
other necessary conditions. Lee then discusses the feasibility of the optimal price
based on its consistency with all the conditions that are used to derive the optimal
prices.
To follow this methodology, we ﬁrst need to establish all the possible boundary
orders. We know that, when Fi is searched ﬁrst, the realized value can only fall ˆ Vi
into a range with boundaries that may take four possible values: Vi  a (deﬁned
as Ai before), pi  c3 (deﬁned as Bi before),    pi  pj  (deﬁned V 2c  j 2
as Ci before), and Vi  a (deﬁned as Di before). Among these four variables, we
know that Ai  Vi  a is the lower bound of pi and Di  Vi  a is the upper
bound of pi because the ﬁrm will not offer a price lower than the lowest value anIPO Pricing Strategies  495
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investor will accept or a price higher than the highest value an investor will accept.
Clearly, the magnitudes of Bi  pi  c3 and Ci    pi  pj  V 2c  j 2
depend on the offering prices, pi and pj, decided by the ﬁrms.
With the constraint that Ai  Di, the sequence of the four possible values (Ai, Bi,
Ci, and Di) can take a total of  12 possible orders. Combining with another
14 – p 24
constraint associated with pj      c3, there are a total of 12 V 2c  j 2
*2 24 possible situations where ﬁrm Fi’s expected payoff function can take
different formats.16
Exhibit 5 provides details of the order conditions and payoffs of these 24
situations. Column 2 of the table reports the order constraint imposed by Ai, Bi,
Ci, and Di; column 3 reports the second constraint (on ) on the situations; and
column 4 reports the implied conditions derived from the order speciﬁed in
columns 2 and 3. Column 5 reports the possible routes this particular situation
might reach. The last two columns report the expected payoffs of a ﬁrm if it is
searched ﬁrst (column 6) and if it is not (column 7).
We can use the third row (situation 2) of Exhibit 5 as an example. The third row
reports an order that is bounded by Bi  Ai  Ci  Di (column 2) and has a
second constraint pj   (column 3). Column 4 indicates that when Bi  Ai 
Ci  Di holds, it follows that Bi  Ai  . This is true because Ai is the lower ˆ Vi
bound of . Since Bi  Ai  , an examination of Panel A of Exhibit 4 indicates ˆˆ VV ii
that the only possible routes this order can reach are routes [1] and [2]. (This
information is reported in column 5 of Exhibit 5.) From Panel B of Exhibit 4, we
know that if ﬁrm Fi is searched ﬁrst, its payoff is either (route [1]) or
[1] [2]  iL iL
(route [2]). In this case, the probability for the investor to take route [1] and route
[2] are 1/2a and 1/2a , respectively. Consequently, the expected
DC ii ˆˆ  dV  dV C i A i ii
value of being searched ﬁrst for situation 2 is E(iL)  1/2a 
D [1] C ii ˆ   dV  C iL i A ii
1/2a (as reported in column 6 of Exhibit 5). Alternatively, if the ﬁrm is
[2] ˆ  dV iL i
not searched ﬁrst, we know from Panel B of Exhibit 4 that its payoff is (route
[1]  iR
[1]) or (route [2]). In this case, the probability for the investor to take route
[2]  iR
[1] and route [2] are 1/2a and 1/2a , respectively. Consequently,
D C j j ˆˆ  dV  dV j A j C j j
the expected value when a ﬁrm is searched for situation 2 is E(iR) 
D [1] j   iR Cj
1/2a  1/2a (as reported in column 7 of Exhibit 5). From columns C [2] j ˆˆ dV   dV j A iR j j
6 and 7, we can calculate the expected payoff of a ﬁrm for each situation as E(i)
 E(i)L  E(i)R. 11 –– 22
For each possible situation, we will ﬁrst examine if the situation actually exists.
This is necessary because there are multiple constraints for each situation and
those constraints might conﬂict with each other. Nine situations (situations 1, 3,
5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, and 21) actually do not exist. We can use situation 1 as an
example. Situation 1 requires both Bi  Di and pj   to hold simultaneously. A
detailed analysis in the Appendix proves that the two constraints cannot exist
simultaneously. After taking out the nine situations that do not exist, we still have
15 feasible situations. For these 15 situations, we solve for the optimal price of
each situation. This is done by solving for the offering price that maximizes the
































1 Bi, Ai, Ci, Di pj   Bi  Ai  ˆ Vi none — —
2 Bi, Ai, Ci, Di pj   Same as
above
[1], [2]
Di 1 ˆ [1]   dV iL i
C 2a i
Ci 1 ˆ [2]   dV iL i
A 2a i
Dj 1 ˆ [1]   dV iR j
C 2a j
Cj 1 ˆ [2]   dV iR j
A 2a j
3 Ai, Bi, Ci, Di pj   none — —
4 Ai, Bi, Ci, Di pj   [1], [2],
[4]
Di 1 ˆ [1]   dV iL i
C 2a i
Ci 1 ˆ [2]   dV iL i
B 2a i
Bi 1 ˆ [4]   V iL i
A 2a. i
Dj 1 ˆ [1]   dV iR j
C 2a j
Cj 1 ˆ [2]   dV iR j
B 2a j
Bj 1 ˆ [4]   dV iR j
A 2a j
5 Ai, Ci, Bi, Di pj   if Bi  ˆ Vi
then Ci  ˆ Vi
none — —
6 Ai, Ci, Bi, Di pj   Same as
above
[1], [4]
Di 1 ˆ [1]   dV iL i
B 2a i
Bi 1 ˆ [4]   dV iL i
A 2a i
Dj 1 ˆ [1]   dV iR j
B 2a j
Bj 1 ˆ [4]   dV iR j
A 2a j
7 Ai, Ci, Di, Bi pj   Bi  Di  ˆ Vi [3] Wi Vi
8 Ai, Ci, Di, Bi pj   Same as
above
[4] Wi Wi













































Exhibit 5  (continued)











10 Bi, Ci, Ai, Di pj   Same as
above
[1] pi Vi
11 Ci, Bi, Ai, Di pj   Same as
above
none — —
12 Ci, Bi, Ai, Di pj   Same as
above
[1] pi Vi
13 Ci, Ai, Bi, Di pj   none — —
14 Ci, Ai, Bi, Di pj   [1], [4]
Di 1 ˆ [1]   dV iL i
B 2a i
Bi 1 ˆ [4]   dV iL i
A 2a i
Dj 1 ˆ [1]   dV iR j
B 2a j
Bj 1 ˆ [4]   dV iR i
A 2a j
15 Ci, Ai, Di, Bi pj   Bi  Di  ˆ Vi [3] Wi Vi
16 Ci, Ai, Di, Bi pj   Same as
above
[4] Wi Wi
17 Bi, Ai, Di, Ci pj   Bi  Ai  ˆ Vi none — —
18 Bi, Ai, Di, Ci pj   Same as
above
[2] Same as above Same as above





















Exhibit 5  (continued)











20 Ai, Bi, Di, Ci pj   [2], [4]
Di 1 ˆ [2]   dV iL i
B 2a i
Bi 1 ˆ [4]   dV iL i
A 2a i
Dj 1 ˆ [2]   dV iR j
B 2a j
Bj 1 ˆ [4]   dV iR j
A 2a j
21 Ai, Di, Bi, Ci pj   Bi  Di  ˆ Vi none — —
22 Ai, Di, Bi, Ci pj   Same as
above
[4] Wi Wi
23 Ai, Di, Ci, Bi pj   Same as
above
[3] Wi Vi
24 Ai, Di, Ci, Bi pj   Same as
above
[4] Wi Wi
Notes: This table summarizes 24 situations, in each of which a ﬁrm’s expected payoff function may take a different form. Ai, Bi, Ci, Di,a n d are
abbreviations with Ai  Vi  a  Min( ), Bi  pi  c3, Ci    pi  pj  , Di  Vi  a  Max( ), and     c3 (note ˆˆ VV 2c  VV 2c  ij2 ij 2
that Ai  Di), where pi and pj are the IPO prices; Vi and Vj are the intrinsic stock values; and are the stock values after the searches; a is the post- ˆˆ VV ij
search information bias; c2 and c3 are the investor’s search costs for the second stock’s value and further investment opportunities, respectively; [1], [2], [3],
and [4] are the four routes that the investor can take after the ﬁrst search: [1] accept the ﬁrst offer without a second search, [2] conduct a second search
then decide to accept either the ﬁrst offer or the second offer, [3] reject both offers without a second search, or [4] conduct a second search then decidet o
either accept the second offer or reject both offers. The notations and (where k  1, 2, 3, 4) are deﬁned in Panel B of Exhibit 4. [k] [k]  iL iRIPO Pricing Strategies  499
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Max E()  E()  E() , (1) ii L i R 22 {p } i
where E(i)L is the expected payoff of Fi if Fi is searched ﬁrst by the investor,
and E(i)R is the expected payoff of Fi if Fj is searched ﬁrst by the investor.
We can categorize the optimal prices for the remaining 15 situations into three
categories. The ﬁrst category includes the cases where we obtain an interior
solution for the optimal price. These include situations 4, 14, and 20. The second
category includes the cases where we obtain a corner solution. These include
situations 2, 6, 10, 12, and 18. These ﬁve situations with a corner optimal solution
are adjoining the situations with an interior optimal solution. A further analysis
indicates that all the situations with a corner solution are dominated by the
situations with an interior solution. The last group includes the cases where the
optimal pricing strategy of the ﬁrm leads to a net deadweight loss. Situations 8,
16, 22, 24, 7, 15, and 23 belong to this category. Given the fact that the expected
payoff is negative, a rational ﬁrm will not adopt a pricing strategy that will result
in such a situation. Consequently, those situations will not exist under the optimal
conditions. We, therefore, do not need to worry about them. Exhibit 6 summarizes
the outcomes of all these 24 situations.
Therefore, the optimal solutions of the three situations with an interior solution
will be from a ﬁrm’s optimal pricing strategy. Proposition 1 summarizes a ﬁrm’s
pricing strategy. The pricing strategy will be reported as the difference between
the intrinsic stock value, Vi, and the optimal stock offering price set by the ﬁrm,
,o r p* i
D*  V  p*. (2) ii i
We term as the relative price. A positive indicates that the ﬁrm is willing D* D* ii
to price the stock below the intrinsic value it identiﬁes. A negative indicates D* i
that the offering price of the stock is higher than the ﬁrm’s intrinsic stock value.
Proposition 1. When ﬁrm Fi observes Vi  a      Vi  a (case V 2c  j 2
1), its optimal pricing strategy will result in:
D*  V  p*  3a  c  2a(6a  V  2c  W). (3) ii i 3 i 3 i
When ﬁrm Fi observes Vi  a    (case 2), its optimal pricing V 2c  j 2
strategy will result in:500  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Exhibit 6  Firms’ Optimization Solutions
Situation Index Solution Situation Index Solution
1 Conﬂicting constraints 13 Conﬂicting constraints
2 Corner, dominated by
interior in situation 4
14 Interior
3 Conﬂicting constraints 15 Deadweight loss
4 interior 16 Deadweight loss
5 Conﬂicting constraints 17 Conﬂicting constraints
6 Corner, dominated by
interior in situation 4
18 Corner, dominated by
interior in situation 20
7 Deadweight loss 19 Conﬂicting constraints
8 Deadweight loss 20 Interior
9 Conﬂicting constraints 21 Conﬂicting constraints
10 Corner, dominated by
interior in situation 14
22 Deadweight loss
11 Conﬂicting constraints 23 Deadweight loss
12 Corner, dominated by
interior in situations 14
24 Deadweight loss
Note: This table summarizes the ﬁrm’s optimization solution in each of the 24 situations, where the
conditions for each situation are as described in Exhibit 5.
1
D*  V  p*  (V  a  c  W). (4) ii i i 3 i 2
When ﬁrm Fi observes    Vi  a (case 3), its optimal pricing V 2c  j 2
strategy will result in:
D*  V  p*  3a  c  2a(3a  V  c  W). (5) ii i 3 i 3 i
All the equilibria suggest that the IPO offering price increases in the investor’s
additional search costs if the investor decides not to buy one of the two stocks,
increases in the estimated range of the postsearch value, and decreases in the costs
if an IPO fails, orIPO Pricing Strategies  501
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	p* 	p* 	p* 	p* 	p* ii i i i  0 (implies  0 and  0),  0 and  0.
	c 	c 	 	a 	W 31 i
(6)
The signs take opposite directions when we analyze the difference between the
ﬁrm’s intrinsic value and the offering price (  Vi  ), or D* p* ii
	D* 	D* 	D* 	D* ii i i  0 (implies  0 and  0),  0
	c 	c 	 	a 31
	D* i and  0. (7)
	Wi
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 reports that the 24 situations can be re-categorized into three
segments and there is a global optimal price strategy within each segment. The
ﬁrst segment (case 1) is set by Vi  a      Vi  a, which V 2c  j 2
includes situations 1 to 8 reported in Exhibit 5. Proposition 1 reports that the
global optimum in this segment is an interior solution (situation 4) that dominates
two other corner solutions (situations 2 and 6) obtained in the same segment, or
 Vi  3a  c3  To be located in this D* p* 2a(6a  V  2c  W). ii i 3 i
segment (case 1), the magnitude of the search cost must be moderate (or cannot
be too large or too small) on the full range of the cost spectrum so that it can
satisfy the constraint set by Vi  a      Vi  a. Therefore, we V 2c  j 2
can refer to case 1 as a moderate search cost case.
The second segment (case 2) is set by Vi  a    , which includes V 2c  j 2
situations 9 to 16. Proposition 1 reports that the global optimum in this segment
is an interior solution (situation 14) that dominates two other corner solutions
(situations 10 and 12) obtained in the same segment, or  Vi  1 – D* p* ii 2
(Vi  a  c3  Wi). To be located in this segment (case 2), the magnitude of the
search cost must be large (or must be on the larger side of the full range of the
cost spectrum) so that it can satisfy the constraint set by Vi  a    Vj
. Given this, we can refer to case 2 as an expensive search case. 2c  2
The third range (case 3) is set by    Vi  a, which includes V 2c  j 2
situations 17 to 24. The global optimum in this segment is an interior solution
(situation 20) that dominates the corner solution (situation 18) obtained in this
range, or  Vi  (Vi  a  c3  Wi). To be located in this segment 1 – D* p* ii 2502  Chan, Wang, and Yang
(case 3), the magnitude of the search cost must be on the smaller side of the full
range of the cost spectrum so that it can satisfy the constraint set by    Vj
 Vi  a. Thus, we can refer to case 3 as an inexpensive search case. 2c  2
It should be noted that when the three cases are combined, the range of c3 covers
all possible ranges spanned by the parameters. Given this, Proposition 1 provides
a complete solution set for a ﬁrm’s optimal pricing strategy. Proposition 1 also
reports that the sign of the relative price can be positive or negative depending D* i
on the values of the parameters. Those variables include the deadweight loss (if
an IPO fails) Wi, the search cost c1, the speed that the investor can learn from
previous searches , and the magnitude of the price range a, from which an
investor will draw the ﬁrm’s value. Given these and depending on the parameter
values, our model can predict both overpricing and underpricing strategies (in
relation to the intrinsic value, not to the market clearance price on the ﬁrst public
trading day). Clearly, our model may be able to shed some light on the empirical
observations that underpricing levels vary by industries and by time periods.
Extreme Conditions
Proposition 1 states that the optimal price level and the corresponding relative p* i
level (which is the difference between the intrinsic value the ﬁrm believes and D* i
the optimal price the ﬁrm will offer) will be affected by three factors (namely,
search costs, the range of the post-search value, and the deadweight cost if an
IPO fails). We will examine several extreme conditions to bring out the impact
each factor might have on the price decision of the ﬁrm. Those results will then
be used to explain some empirical irregularities observed in the ﬁeld.
When Wi  Vi. If we assume that the downside loss is zero such that Wi  Vi,
then Equations (3), (4), and (5) can be reduced to:
D*  (3a  c )(3a  c  4a)  0, (8) i 33
1
D*  (a  c )  0, and (9) i 3 2
D*  (3a  c )(3a  c  4a)  0, respectively. (10) i 33
In this case, ﬁrms will set the price higher than their perceived intrinsic value of
the ﬁrm. In other words, ﬁrms will overprice their IPOs if there is no deadweight
cost when the IPOs fail. This is true because there is no penalty for the ﬁrm to
set the price at a high level; however, there is a cost for the investor if the stock
is not purchased. It is also clear from the equations above that the larger the a or
c3, the higher the price the ﬁrms will offer.IPO Pricing Strategies  503
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When Wi  Vi and a  0. If we assume that Wi  Vi and if the investor can come
up with only one consistent estimate of the stock value (or a  0), then Equations
(3), (4), and (5) can be reduced to  c3,  c3, and  c3, 1 – D* D*  D* ii 2 i
respectively. Under this circumstance, ﬁrms will overprice their stocks. The
magnitude of overpricing depends only on the magnitude of the search costs. This
makes sense because a ﬁrm knows that the investor will accept the offer price if
the difference between the offering price and the investor’s perceived value of the
ﬁrm’s stock is less than (or equal to) the cost of not buying the stock.
When Wi  Vi and c3  0. If we assume that Wi  Vi and the search cost c3 
0, then Equations (3), (4) and (5) can be reduced to:
D*  3a  12a  0, (11) i
1
D*  a  0, and (12) i 2
D*  3a  12a  0, respectively. (13) i
Under this extreme circumstance, ﬁrms will deﬁnitely overprice their stocks to
maximize their proﬁts. The magnitude of the overpricing depends on the range
from which the investor draws the value of the stock. The larger the range, the
higher the price will be. This makes sense. If the ﬁrm knows that the estimated
value the investor will draw after the search is from a range [X  10, X  10],
it is more likely to offer a price higher than that it would offer if it knows that
the estimated value is from a range [X  1, X  1].
This result is consistent with the prediction of the price-optimism type of models
pioneered by Miller (1977). The price-optimism models predict that the bigger
the disagreement about the value of a stock, the higher the market price relative
to the true value of the stock (and, therefore, the lower the future returns of the
stock). Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) provide empirical evidence to
support this prediction. They ﬁnd that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’
forecasts earn signiﬁcantly lower future returns. They also reject the notion that
dispersion in forecasts can be viewed as a proxy for risk. Chemmanur and Paeglis
(2005) examine the relationship between the quality of a ﬁrm’s management and
the post-IPO performance. They ﬁnd that if higher management quality is
associated with lower heterogeneity in investor valuations, ﬁrms with better
managers will have greater long-term stock returns. Our model predicts that issuers
will offer a lower price when they see a lower heterogeneity in investor valuations
(and therefore, a higher future stock return). This prediction is consistent with the
result reported by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).
It is also quite possible that the magnitude of a might not be small. Using the
product market as an example, we frequently ﬁnd that the values different504  Chan, Wang, and Yang
appraisers place on the same property at the same time can differ by more than
10% even though all appraisers are adequately trained and use similar (if not
identical) market information to derive the property value. Similarly, sealed bids
on corporate assets (during corporate takeover battles) can vary signiﬁcantly
among bidders even though all bidders are sophisticated players in the game. The
only time that the magnitude of a could be small is when the value of the ﬁrm is
difﬁcult to assess because information about its assets is difﬁcult to obtain (or its
business is too complex for the players to learn or understand). Under this
circumstance, since investors cannot perform their own analyses, their estimate
might depend on what is available in the market (such as the valuation provided
by some analysts).
When Wi  Vi,a 0, and c3  0. If we further assume that Wi  Vi, a  0, and
the search cost c3  0, then Equations (3), (4), and (5) are all reduced to  D* i
0. Under this circumstance, there is no under- or over-pricing. Indeed, ﬁrms will
just price their IPOs at their perceived intrinsic values.
Implications
As indicated by Proposition 1, issuing ﬁrms are willing to reduce their offering
prices if the cost of a failed IPO (or Wi) is high. This is true because a lower
(higher) offering price will increase (decrease) the likelihood of a successful
offering. It is reasonable for a ﬁrm to offer a low (high) price when the deadweight
cost is high (low). Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) show that underwriters
tend to reduce the underpricing level if the issuer has a credible option to withdraw
the offer. This evidence seems to support our model predictions.
Given this, the asset redeployment ability of a ﬁrm could affect its pricing
decision. For a ﬁrm with mainly redeployable (or tangible) assets, it will have less
incentive to reduce its offering price. This is true because the ﬁrm may be able
to sell its assets in the product market or to other ﬁrms at a price similar to its
IPO price should the IPO fail. On the other hand, a ﬁrm with signiﬁcant intangible
assets (or one that believes it can sell its assets at a much higher price in the
public stock market than in the product market) will want to set its IPO at a low
price to avoid a failure.
This story seems very suitable for explaining the anomalous evidence on the initial
day return patterns of REIT IPOs during the 1971–2000 period. Wang, Chan, and
Gau (1992) report that the 87 REIT IPOs issued during the 1971–1988 period
were signiﬁcantly overpriced, with an average initial day return of 2.82%.
However, the pricing pattern changed after 1990. Chan, Erickson, and Wang
(2002) report that the 159 REIT IPOs during the 1990–2000 period are
signiﬁcantly underpriced, with a positive average initial day return of 2.36%. It
should be noted that after 1990, REITs changed their structure from a traditional
fund-like trust to one that includes an operational component in its daily routine.
In other words, on top of the assets REITs own, the management component also
became part of the value of REITs after 1990.17IPO Pricing Strategies  505
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It is fair to argue that when REITs have a fund-like structure, the deadweight cost
for a failed IPO is quite small. All a REIT needs to do when an IPO fails is to
either sell the individual properties it owns in the property market or sell the
properties (as a package) to other large real estate investors (including other
publicly-traded REITs). Given this, unless the REIT believes that it can sell its
assets at a much higher price in the open stock market than in the property market,
it can be argued that the cost of a failed REIT IPO is quite small. Under this
scenario, our discussions above indicate that REIT IPOs will be overpriced. That
is, a ﬁrm will price its IPO above its perceived intrinsic value. Equations (3), (4),
and (5) indicate that if we set a  0.05Vi and c3  0.01Vi, the initial day return
is about 3% if Vi  Wi is also small.18 This 3% overpricing result is similar to
the 2.82% initial day return reported for REIT IPOs during the 1971–1988
period (when REITs were still holding their traditional fund-like structure). During
the 1990s, REITs changed and behaved more like operating companies. With the
change, the ﬁrm value now includes intangible assets and some assets that cannot
be sold in the property market. Given this, the deadweight cost of the new REITs
(with operational components) should be higher than that of the old REITs (with
fund-like structures). If we let Vi  Wi  0.10Vi, Equations (3), (4), and (5)
indicate that the underpricing level should be around 2%, which is consistent with
the empirical result reported by Chan, Erickson, and Wang (2002) for 2.36% initial
day return for REIT IPOs issued during the 1990–2000 period.
Peavy (1990) reports that the 38 mutual fund IPOs issued during the 1986–1987
period are not over- or under-priced (with an average initial day return 0.62%).
The implications of our model are most suitable to explain this nearly 0% initial
day return for mutual fund IPOs. There is no doubt that most (if not all) assets
of a mutual fund can be sold in the open stock market at a known price. Since
price information is readily available, there is no need for an investor to incur
additional costs. Given this, it is reasonable to argue that for mutual fund IPOs,
the deadweight costs, search costs, and estimated range of post-search values are
all zero (Vi  Wi  0, a  0, and c3  0). Our analyses above indicate that
mutual fund IPOs should be neither under-priced nor over-priced.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) report an insigniﬁcant 0.04% initial day return for
the 39 MLP IPOs issued during the 1984–1988 period. They argue that this should
be the case because there are no informed investors (institutional investors) in the
MLP IPO market and underwriters do not need to underprice the IPOs to
compensate the uninformed investors. While this explanation makes some sense,
it cannot explain why REIT IPOs (that have about 10% institutional participation
during the 1980–1990 period) are signiﬁcantly overpriced during the similar
period. Again, similar to REITs, MLPs normally also hold tangible assets (such
as hotels, retails, oil, and gas) in their portfolios. If a MLP disbands, it can also
sell its assets in the open product markets quite easily. If this happens, the largest
cost that cannot be recovered might be the partnership set-up costs. More
importantly, since partnerships normally have buy-out clauses to increase the
liquidity of the units they issue, it is not very important for them to have access506  Chan, Wang, and Yang
to the open stock market. Given this, the cost of a failed IPO should not be too
great for MLP IPOs.
However, unlike REITs, the value of partnership arrangements of each individual
MLP might be difﬁcult to judge. This is the case because a MLP typically has
complicated arrangements (i.e., for tax purposes) among different parties that
might affect the value of the underlying assets it owns. However, there is typically
not enough information for an investor to adequately assess the value of those
arrangements. Given this, it might be prudent to argue that the estimated range of
the post-search values should be wider for a MLP than for a modern REIT (with
an operation component). Consequently, with a deadweight cost level similar to
that of a modern REIT, the result of no under- or over- pricing of a MLP IPO is
possible because of an offsetting effect resulting from the positive price effect of
the search cost and the estimated range of post-search values and the negative
price effect of the deadweight costs if the IPO fails.
Our model might also have some implications as to why the aggregate level of
underpricing changes over time and differs among industries. At this moment since
we do not model investor sentiment in the aftermarket, we implicitly assume that
the expected initial day price trading in the open stock market should be about
the same as the ﬁrm’s perceived intrinsic value of its stock. If we relax this implicit
assumption, our model might shed some light on the high initial day returns
observed in the hot IPO markets.
In a hot IPO market, it is possible that the expected stock price at the initial
trading day is higher than the ﬁrm’s estimated intrinsic value of the stock.19 Under
this circumstance, ﬁrms can use (1) the expected aftermarket stock price as the
intrinsic value of the ﬁrm, or (2) still keep its original estimate of the intrinsic
value but treat the expected high price in the aftermarket as a windfall gain. If
the ﬁrm revises its estimate of the intrinsic value, all our model implications will
still hold.
However, under circumstance (2) where the ﬁrm keeps its original estimate of the
intrinsic value and treats the possible high price in the aftermarket as a potential
gain when the IPO is successful, then the story could be different. Indeed, if we
include a ﬁrm’s inability to sell its assets in the stock market as a cost when an
offer fails, the deadweight cost will be particularly high when the aftermarket is
hot. In other words, when issuers believe that their assets can be traded at a much
higher price in the stock market than in the product market, they have an incentive
to underprice their stocks to avoid the possibility of a failed IPO. On the other
hand, if the market is cold and issuers are not sure if their stocks will be traded
at their perceived intrinsic values, the issuers might have more incentive to price
the stock at the value they believe the stock is worth. Given this, we should
observe a lower offering price (relative to the ﬁrm’s perceived intrinsic value)
during a hot market than during a cold market.20 Our reasoning complements the
explanation offered by Loughran and Ritter (2002). These authors argue that
issuers will care less about the offering price of an IPO if they expect their stocksIPO Pricing Strategies  507
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to perform well in the aftermarket. If we also include the private beneﬁts for
insiders of the issuing companies (such as family programs and executive stock
option programs, which are frequently used tools during the internet frenzy) as a
cost if an IPO fails, then the issuer (at least the executives of the issuing ﬁrm)
might have more incentive to lower the offering price. This is especially true if
the strike price of the executive option is equal to the offering price of the IPO
(rather than to the ﬁrst aftermarket price).21
In addition, when the market is hot (and ﬂooded with many IPOs), it is possible
that the search cost, c3, and the estimated range of investor’s post-search values a
will also be reduced. According to our model, a ﬁrm will have more incentive to
offer a low price when the magnitudes of a and c3 are small. Given this, all three
parameters in our model indicate that IPOs in a hot market should be more
underpriced than if otherwise.
Since our model predictions are based on three parameters Wi, a, and c3,i ti s
quite possible that ﬁrms in the same industry might share same parameter values.
For example, the deadweight cost should be about the same within an industry.
Consequently, ﬁrms in industries with more intangible assets have an incentive to
price their IPOs lower than ﬁrms in industries with more tangible assets. (The
amount of intangible assets can be used as a proxy for the deadweight costs Wi
when an IPO fails.) It can also be argued that a and c3 might be high for industries
in the early stage. As the industry matures, the magnitudes of a and c3 should be
reduced. Given this, holding everything else constant, industries at different stages
of maturity might have different magnitudes of search costs (c3) and estimated
ranges of post-search values (a) for their IPOs. Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm
(2002) and Benveniste, Ljungquist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) believe that valuation
uncertainty is composed of an industry component and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component.
It will be less costly and easier for investors to evaluate the value of a ﬁrm if
there is a lot of information on other ﬁrms in the same industry. On the other
hand, for ﬁrms in industries that do not have much information (or comparables)
for investors to adequately assess their values (and, therefore, have high estimated
ranges of post-search values) and do not have much deadweight costs when an
IPO failed, their IPO stocks may be aggressively sold to investors at prices higher
than ﬁrms’ perceived intrinsic stock values.
 The Optimal Underwriting Contract
Our model so far ignores the role played by an underwriter and can only be applied
to a situation described by a best-efforts contract (although in this contract issuers
still need an underwriter). However, if we assume that the underwriter maximizes
the joint payoff to the issuer and the underwriter, maximizing the joint payoff is
the same as maximizing the issuer’s payoff (since the underwriter does not need
to buy all the stocks from the issuer if the IPO fails). Therefore, we did not bring
the underwriter into the picture explicitly in the previous sections.508  Chan, Wang, and Yang
In this section, we will introduce an underwriter into our model and analyze a
ﬁrm commitment contract. To simplify the model development and to adhere to
the spirit of our model, we assume that the underwriter and the ﬁrms share the
same information and have identical goals. In other words, there are neither
information asymmetry nor agency conﬂicts between these two parties.22 Since
the objectives of the ﬁrm and the underwriter are assumed to be the same, the
optimal pricing decision is the one that maximizes the joint payoff to the ﬁrm and
the underwriter.
To start the analysis, we assume that the underwriter will purchase the IPO share
at price pi if the offer fails. When this happens, the underwriter will sell the share
in the aftermarket, while the ﬁrm will receive the offering price pi from the
underwriter.23 The underwriting costs are sunk and are not considered in the
model.24 We also ignore the commission disparity between a best-efforts and a
ﬁrm commitment contract by assuming a unique commission rate mi for all types
of IPOs.
Therefore, if the stock is successfully sold in the aftermarket at price pi, the issuing
ﬁrm’s payoff is pi (1  mi) and its underwriter’s payoff is pimi. The joint payoff
to the ﬁrm and its underwriter is pi. It should be noted that when the IPO is
successful, the joint payoff to the ﬁrm and underwriter is the same as that under
a best-efforts contract. If the issuance fails, the ﬁrm’s payoff is still the same
pi(1  mi) since the underwriter will purchase the stock from the issuer. (Under
a best-efforts contract, the ﬁrm receives Wi and its underwriter receives zero.) The
underwriter will then sell the stock in the aftermarket at (Our assumptions M. i
about the ﬁrms and their underwriters imply that they both have the same estimate
of the aftermarket price 25 In addition, if the offer fails, we assume that the M.) i
underwriter faces a reputation cost (for not being able to sell the stock in the IPO
market and will consequently lose market share). We term this the underwriter’s
failure cost 
i. Given this, the payoff to the underwriter when the offer fails is
 
i  pi(1  mi). Correspondingly, the joint payoff to the ﬁrm and the Mi
underwriter is  
i. In our model framework, the joint payoffs to the ﬁrm and Mi
underwriter are the same (regardless of contract type) if a ﬁrm is not searched by
an investor. Exhibit 7 summarizes the possible payoffs to the underwriter and the
ﬁrm for the ten terminal nodes identiﬁed in Exhibit 2.
Firm’s Strategies Under a Firm Commitment Contract
The optimal pricing strategy of a ﬁrm using a ﬁrm commitment contract can be
solved by following the procedure we used above. The results are summarized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. With a ﬁrm commitment contract, when ﬁrm Fi observes Vi  a 
    Vi  a (case 1), its optimal pricing strategy will result in V 2c  j 2
 Vi  3a  c3  When ﬁrm Fi D* p*  . 2a(6a  V  2c  M  
) ii i 3 ii
observes Vi  a    (case 2), its optimal pricing strategy will V 2c  j 2
result in  Vi  (Vi  a  c3  
i). When ﬁrm Fi observes 1 – D* p* M ii 2 iIPO Pricing Strategies  509
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Exhibit 7  Outcomes and Payoffs under Firm Commitment Contract
Terminal
Node Investor’s Choices Payoffs (I , i, j)
NAi Accept pi immediately after 1st search
(on Vi)
(Vi  pi  c1, pi, Vj)
NOi Reject pi and pj immediately after 1st search
(on Vi)
(c1  c3,  
1, Vj) M1
SAi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then accept pi (Vi  pi  c1  c2, pi,  
2) M2
SRi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then accept pj (Vj  pj  c1  c2,  
1, pj) M1
SOi Hold pi, conduct 2nd search, then reject
both
(c1  c3,  
1,  
2) MM 12
NAj Accept pj immediately after 1st search
(on Vj)
(Vj  pj  c1, Vi, pj)
NOj Reject pi and pj immediately after 1st search
(on Vj)
(c1  c3, Vi,  
2) M2
SAj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then accept pi (Vi  pi  c1  c2, pi,  
2) M2
SRj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then accept pj (Vj  pj  c1  c2,  
1, pj) M1
SOj Hold pj, conduct 2nd search, then reject
both
(c1  c2  c3,  
1,  
2) MM 12
Note: This table summarizes all possible outcomes and corresponding payoffs for the investor and
the ﬁrms under a ﬁrm commitment contract. NAi, NOi, SAi, SRi, SOi, NAj, NOj, SAj, SRj,a n dSOj
are the indexes for outcomes (see Exhibit 1), each matched with a set of the investor’s choices. pi
and pj are the two IPO prices. I, i,a n dj denote the payoffs to the investor, the ﬁrst ﬁrm, and
the second ﬁrm, respectively. is the expected after market clearance price, and 
i is the Mi
underwriter’s reputation loss if it cannot sell the stock at the IPO stage. c1, c2,a n dc3 are the
investor’s search costs for the ﬁrst ﬁrm, second ﬁrm, and further investment opportunities,
respectively.
   Vi  a (case 3), its optimal pricing strategy will result in V 2c  j 2
 Vi  3a  c3  All the equilibria D* p*2  . a(3a  V  c  M  
) ii i 3 ii
suggest that the IPO offering price increases in the investor’s search costs, the
estimated range of the post-search values, and the expected market clearance price.
The price decreases in the underwriter’s failure cost.
	p* 	p* 	p* 	p* ii i i  0 (which implies  0 and  0),  0,
	c 	c 	 	a 31
	p* i and  0. (14)
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The signs take opposite directions when we analyze the difference between the
ﬁrm’s intrinsic value and the offering price (  Vi  ), or D* p* ii
	D* 	D* 	D* 	D* ii i i  0 (which implies  0 and  0),  0,
	c 	c 	 	a 31




Proof. See the Appendix.
The results resemble those under the best-efforts contract, with the downside
payoff Wi being replaced by  
i. Again, the relationship between and a MD * ii
and the relationship between and c3 are exactly the same as that reported for D* i
the best-efforts contract. However, now when the issuance fails (i.e., the offered
stocks cannot be sold at the IPO stage), the cost to the issuers and the underwriter
combined is changed from Vi  Wi into Vi  
i). If we assume the ﬁrm’s (Mi
perceived intrinsic value of its stock (or Vi) is the same as the price it estimates
the stock will be traded in the open market (or ), the deadweight costs when Mi
an IPO fails will be 
i. Equation (14) reports that ﬁrms will lower the IPO price
if the underwriter failure cost 
i is high. With this simpliﬁcation, all implications
derived in Proposition 1 hold in Proposition 2.
Contract Selection
The ﬁrm and the underwriter will select an underwriting contract that generates a
higher joint payoff E(i) to them. Under this circumstance, since the two contracts
differ only in the downside payoffs, the contract selection is actually the selection
of a better downside payoff. We deﬁne i as the downside payoff, where i 
Wi if a best-efforts contract is selected and i  
i if a ﬁrm commitment Mi
contract is selected. Given this simpliﬁcation, the contract selection problem
becomes:
11
Max E()  E(())  E(()) (16) ii i L i i R 22  {W, M
 } ii i i
Substituting the optimal price in each case derived in Propositions 1 and 2 into
the corresponding expected payoff function, we can compare the expected payoffs
under the two contracts. The one with the higher expected payoff is the one that
should be selected by the ﬁrm. Proposition 3 summarizes the ﬁrm’s optimal
contract decision rules.IPO Pricing Strategies  511
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Proposition 3. When ﬁrm Fi and its underwriter maximize their joint payoff, the
optimal contract for them is (1) a ﬁrm commitment contract if  
i  Wi,( 2 ) Mi
a best-efforts contract if  
i  Wi, and (3) either contract if  
i  Wi. MM ii
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result indicates that the underwriting contract choice depends only on the
magnitudes of the downside payoffs. This result seems intuitive. Since the
underwriter and the owner maximize their joint payoff and since the two contracts
differ only in the downside payoff, both the underwriter and the owner will select
the contract with a higher downside payoff (or a lower failure cost). When the
cost of a failed IPO is higher for the ﬁrm than for the underwriter (or Vi  Wi 

i), they will select a best-efforts contract. However, if the underwriter’s failure
cost is higher than that of the ﬁrm’s (or 
i  Vi  Wi), then they will select a
ﬁrm commitment contract.
We recognize that the set-up of our model in this section is over-simpliﬁed and
ignores a rich literature on the roles underwriters play in the IPO process.
However, our sole purpose in this section is to demonstrate that if the underwriter
and the owner jointly maximize their payoff, the results of our model presented
in the previous section still hold (including an underpricing of the IPO stock).
Actually, without appealing to asymmetric information and other related stories,
our result (based on deadweight and search costs) supports Muscarella and
Vetsuypens’s (1989) ﬁnding that underwriters underprice their own IPOs as much
as other IPOs in the market during a similar period. When an underwriter
underwrites its own stocks, it must maximize the joint payoff to both the owner
and the underwriter.
 Conclusion
This study is an attempt to provide a novel, yet convincing, model to explain the
IPO pricing puzzle reported in the vast empirical literature. We approach this issue
from the owner’s perspective, and model a ﬁrm’s pricing strategies conditional
upon an investor’s decision-making process. We suggest that (1) the deadweight
cost (reputation loss and issuance cost) for an issuing ﬁrm if its issuance fails, (2)
the additional information search costs for an investor if alternative investments
are investigated, and (3) the likelihood that investors can get consensus opinion
(or draw from a narrow range) on the value of the IPO stock, are the three
parameters affecting a ﬁrm’s pricing decision. Therefore, depending on the
parameter values, an IPO can be overpriced, slightly underpriced, or signiﬁcantly
underpriced. Our model is particularly suitable for explaining the anomalous
evidence reported for REIT IPOs, MLP IPOs, and mutual fund IPOs (for which
current theories fail to provide a full explanation). In addition, our results provide
a partial explanation for the IPO hot-market phenomenon and suggest that IPO
underpricing levels could vary across industries.512  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Our model framework can be extended to include the interactions between the
underwriter and the issuer. Although an equilibrium solution for a model with this
type of extension might be very difﬁcult to derive, we believe that a successful
attempt in this direction should generate insights that help us further understand
the puzzling IPO phenomena. Furthermore, our model can be revised to explain
the pricing decisions in other product (or ﬁnancial) markets. The results of our
model seem to be helpful in guiding the pricing decision of a residential property
owner. Similar to the situation posited in our model, owners in a residential
property market also face competition from their neighbors and a buyer may have
to incur certain costs to search for other properties before making a purchase.
 Appendix
  Proof for Lemma 1
The investor will pay additional search cost to look for investment opportunities
other than the two stocks. Taking into account this cost, if  pi  c3,t h e ˆ Vi
investor knows for sure one of the two stocks will be purchased (but still does
not know if it will be ﬁrm Fi or ﬁrm Fj). If  pi  c3, the investor knows ˆ Vi
for sure that stock of Fi will not be purchased at pi (but does not know whether
to accept pj yet).
When V ˆ
i  p i  c 3
After the ﬁrst search (and with a realized value ), the investor needs to decide ˆ Vi
whether to conduct a second search. When  pi  c3, the investor knows ˆ Vi
there are two choices. First, the investor can accept pi without a second search.
Second, the investor can conduct a second search on the stock value of the second
ﬁrm and then decide on whether to accept pi or pj. To make a decision, the investor
needs to compare the payoff of accepting pi with the expected payoff of
conducting a second search. To calculate the latter, the investor has to ﬁrst estimate
the expected value of the second ﬁrm’s stock. Since the investor does not know
but knows the second IPO stock value’s pre-search distribution Vbj  ˆ Vj
U[  ,  ], the expected payoff from a second search depends on the VV jj
offering prices (pi and pj) set by the ﬁrms, or:
ˆ V p p iij
ˆ E( )  (V  p)dV Ii i b j V  j
V  j
 (V  p)dV  c  c . (A1) bj j b 12 j ˆ V p p iijIPO Pricing Strategies  513
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This expected payoff of conducting a second search can then be compared with
the investor’s payoff from accepting pi without a second search (NAi), which is
 pi  c1. The difference is: ˆ Vi
ˆ (V  p  c ) ii1
ˆ V p pV  iij j
ˆ   (V  p)dV  (V  p)dV  c  c  ii b b jj b22 jj ˆ V  V p p j iij
1 2 ˆ  (V  p  p  V  )  c . iijj 2 4 (A2)
The investor should (should not) conduct a second search if Equation (A2) is
negative (positive). This means that the investor should not conduct the second
search if    pj    pi     pj  and conduct ˆ V 2c  VV 2c  j 2 ij 2
the second search if    pj   pi (or  pi    pj ˆˆ V 2c  VV V j 2 ii j
 ). Note that if the investor is willing to pass up the second search, it 2c  2
means that the proﬁt from investing in the ﬁrst stock,  pi, must be high ˆ Vi
enough. Given this, we can eliminate the condition  pi     pj  ˆ VV ij
. If an investor needs to conduct a second search, we know that the proﬁt 2c  2
from investing in the ﬁrst stock (  pi) is not high enough. Given this, we can ˆ Vi
eliminate the condition  pi    pj  . With these two ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
simpliﬁcations, the decision rule can be simpliﬁed to:
ˆ pass up the second search iff V    p  2c   V  p, jj 2 ii
and
ˆ conduct the second search iff V    p  2c   V  p. jj 2 ii
(A3)
Combining with the ﬁrst condition  pi  c3, Equation (A3) indicates that ˆ Vi
if  pi  c3 and    pj    pi, the investor will accept pi ˆˆ VV 2c  V ij 2 i
without conducting a second search. The investor will accept the payoff at terminal
node NAi.I f  pi  c3 and    pj   pi, the investor ˆˆ VV 2c  V ij 2 i
conducts a second search. After this search is done, the investor will compare
 pj with  pi to make the ﬁnal decision. The investor will select ˆˆ VV ji
terminal node SAi (accepting pi after the second search) iff  pi   pj. ˆˆ VV ij
The investor will accept terminal node SRi (accepting pj after the second search)
iff  pj  pi. ˆˆ VV ji514  Chan, Wang, and Yang
When V ˆ
i  p i  c 3
After the ﬁrst search, when the investor observes  pi  c3, the investor ˆ Vi
knows that the stock will not be purchased at pi. The next decision the investor
needs to make is whether a second search should be conducted to investigate the
value of the second stock. The investor knows that if there is a second search, the
result will be either accepting pj (terminal node SRi, with a payoff Vbj  pj)o r
rejecting both (terminal node SOi, with a payoff c3). Again, since the stock value
of the second ﬁrm before the search is Vbj  U[  ,  ], the expected VV jj
value of conducting a second search depends on the offering price of the second
ﬁrm pj and the magnitude of the third search costs c3, or:
p cV  j 3 j
E( )  (c )dV  (V  p)dV  c  c . I 3 bb j j b 12 jj V  p c jj 3
This expected payoff of conducting a second search can be compared to the
investor’s payoff from rejecting both offers without a second search (NOi), which
is c1  c3. The difference is:
(c  c ) 13
p cV  j 3 j
  (c )dV  (V  p)dV  c  c  3 bb j j b 12 jj V  p c jj 3
1 2  (p  c  V  )  c . j 3 j 2 4
The investor should (should not) conduct a second search if this equation is
negative (positive). This means that the investor should not conduct the second
search if    c3  pj (or pj     c3), and conduct V 2c  V 2c  j 2 j 2
the second search if    c3  pj    c3. Note V 2c  V 2c  j 2 j 2
that if the investor is willing to pass up the second search, it means that the second
offering price pj must be high enough. Therefore, we can eliminate the condition
   c3  pj. If an investor needs to conduct a second search, we V 2c  j 2
know that the second offering price pj is not high enough. Given this, we can
eliminate the condition    c3  pj. With these two simpliﬁ- V 2c  j 2
cations, the decision rule can be simpliﬁed to:IPO Pricing Strategies  515
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pass up the second search iff p  V    2c   c , and jj 23
conduct the second search iff p  V    2c   c . jj 23 (A4)
Combining with the ﬁrst condition  pi  c3, Equation (A4) indicates if ˆ Vi
 pi  c3 and pj    c3, the investor will reject both offers ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
without a second search and the game will end at NOi. However, if  pi  ˆ Vi
c3 and pj    c3, the investor will conduct a second search V 2c  j 2
and obtain a realized . The investor will select terminal node SRi (accepting pj, ˆ Vj
with a payoff  pj  c1  c2)i f f  pj  c3. The investor will select ˆˆ VV jj
terminal node SOi (rejecting both offers, with a payoff c1  c2  c3) that gives
the payoff iff  pj  c3. ˆ Vj
This provides the comprehensive decision rules for the investor on the left branch
of the game tree (see Exhibit 1). The decision rules on the right branch of the
game tree are similar to that for the left branch, except that the ﬁrst ﬁrm being
searched is Fj. End of proof.
 Proof for Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we ﬁrst examine the boundary conditions of all the 24
situations summarized in Exhibit 5. The ﬁrst step is to identify those situations
that cannot exist because of a conﬂicting criterion in establishing the orders. We
ﬁnd nine situations (situations 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, and 21) with conﬂicting
constraints. After deleting these nine situations, we analyze the optimal solutions
for the remaining ﬁfteen situations. We obtain an interior solution for the optimal
price for situations 4, 14, and 20. We obtain a corner optimal solution for situations
2, 6, 10, 12, and 18. However, we also ﬁnd that these ﬁve corner situations are
dominated by the situations with an interior solution. Although situations 7, 8,
15, 16, 22, 23, and 24 have a solution, careful analyses indicate that those local
solutions cannot be the global optimal solutions because of deadweight costs. We
will compare the results of all the 24 situations to select the optimal solutions for
the ﬁrms.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that 2a  Vi  Wi  c3.
This sets the maximum social welfare loss when an IPO issuance fails to 2a.W e
know that when an IPO fails, the ﬁrm’s loss is Vi  Wi and the investor’s loss is
c3. This makes sense, as the total loss should not be greater than the difference
between the maximum price (Vi  a) and minimum price (Vi  a) an investor
will pay. Again, we also assume that ﬁrms are symmetric in their pricing decisions
and ﬁrms with identical characteristics should price the same.516  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Situations with an Interior Solution
We ﬁnd three situations that have a local optimal solution, namely, situations 4,
14, and 20. To be a local optimal solution, the optimal price derived must also
satisfy the boundary conditions that characterize the situation. In the interest of
saving space, we will provide a detailed proof for situation 4 and shorter proofs
for the other two situations.
Situation 4. Situation 4 requires Ai  Bi  Ci  Di and pj  . From Panel B
of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in this situation as:
V aV p p 2c ij i j 2 1 ˆ E()  (p) dV  iL i i
V p p 2c  p c 2a ji j 2 i 3
ˆ V p pV a iij j 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (p) dV  (W) dV dV  ij ij i ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a 2a ji i j
p c i 3 1 ˆ  (W) dV. ii
V a 2a i
(A5)
and
V aV p p 2c  ji j i 2 1 ˆ E()  (V) dV  iR i j
V p p 2c  p c 2a ij i 2 j 3
ˆ V p pV a jji i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV  ii ii j ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a 2a ij j i
p cp cV a j 3 i 3 i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV.  ii ii j
V aV ap c 2a 2a 2a ji i 3
(A6)
Equation (A5) characterizes the situation where the investor’s search starts with
ﬁrm Fi. If the ﬁrst search reveals that  [    pi  pj  , Vi  a], ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
we have     pi  pj   pi  c3. Based on the decision rule ˆ VV 2c  ij 2
in Exhibit 4, the investor will go along with route [1]—immediately accepts pi
and ﬁrm Fi receives pi. If the ﬁrst search reveals that  [pi  c3,    ˆ VV ij
pi  pj  ), we have pi  c3     pi  pj  . The ˆ 2c  VV 2c  2 ij 2
investor will go along with route [2]—conducts the second search and compares
 pi with  pj. The payoff of this route is reported in the third row of ˆˆ VV ij
column 2 in Panel B of Exhibit 4. Finally, if the ﬁrst search reveals that  ˆ Vi
[Vi  a, pi  c3), we have pi  c3  . The investor will go along with route ˆ ViIPO Pricing Strategies  517
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[4]—conducts the second search and compares  pj with c3. The payoff of ˆ Vj
Fi in this route is Wi, regardless of the outcome.
Equation (A6) characterizes the situation where the investor’s search starts with
ﬁrm F2. If the ﬁrst search reveals that     pj  pi  , Vj  a], ˆˆ V [V 2c  ji 2
we have     pj  pi   pj  c3. Based on the decision rule ˆ VV 2c  ji 2
in Exhibit 4, the investor will go along with route [1]—immediately accepts pj,
and ﬁrm Fi receives Vi. If the ﬁrst search reveals that  [pj  c3,    ˆ VV ji
pj  pi  ), we have pj  c3     pj  pi  . The ˆ 2c  VV 2c  2 ji 2
investor will go along route [2]—conducts the second search and compares  ˆ Vi
pi with  pj. The payoff of this route is speciﬁed in the third row of column ˆ Vj
3 in Panel B of Exhibit 4. Finally, if the ﬁrst search reveals that  [Vj  a, ˆ Vj
pj  c3), we have  pj  c. The investor will go along with route [4]—conducts ˆ Vj
the second search and compares  pi with c3. The payoff of Fi in this route ˆ Vi
is reported in the 5th row of column 3 in Panel B of Exhibit 4.
The optimization problem for Fi is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() . (A7) ii L i R 22 {p } i
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i 222  {6a  2c  3p  4cp 3 i 3 j 2 dp 16a i
 4pp  p  2(p  p)W  4V(p  c ) ij j i j i i j 3
2  2V  4a(c  4p  p  W  2V)}  0. (A8) i 3 ij i i
Similarly, the optimization problem of Fj is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() , (A9) jj L j R 22 {p } j518  Chan, Wang, and Yang
and the ﬁrst-order condition for Fj is:
dE() 1 j 222  {6a  2c  3p  4cp 4pp 3 j 3 ii j 2 dp 16a j
2  p  2(p  p)W  4V (p  c )  2V ij i j 2 i 3 j
 4a(c  4p  p  W  2V)}  0. (A10) 3 ji j j
From Equations (A8) and (A10), we know that when Vi  Vj and Wi  Wj, pi
must equal pj. Since we assume that ﬁrms are symmetric in their pricing decisions,
this means that ﬁrms with the same value parameters must be priced the same.
Substituting pi  pj into Equation (A8), we obtain:
1 2 {(p  V  c  3a)  2a(6a  V  2c  W)}  0. ii 3 i 3 i 2 8a
(A11)
Since 6a  Vi  2c3  Wi  3(2a  c3)  Vi  Wi  c3  (2a  c3)  Vi 
Wi  c3  0, we have an interior solution. In addition, since pi  Vi  c3  3a
 ((pi  c3)  (Vi  a))  2a  0  2a  0, the interior solution is unique.
Equation (A11) can be simpliﬁed to:
p*  p*  3a  V  c  2a(6a  V  2c  W). ij i 3 i 3 i (A12)
Since:
2 dE ()1 i  (8a  3p  2p  W) ij i 2 dp 8a i
1
 (8a  (V  a)  c  W) i 3 i 2 8a
(given pi  c3  Vi  a)
1
 (6a  V  2c  W)  0, i 3 i 2 8aIPO Pricing Strategies  519
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we know that the solution is a local maximum.
However, to prove that is the optimal solution for this situation, we also need p* i
to conﬁrm that satisﬁes all the constraints that characterize situation 4. In other p* i
words, we must show that is consistent with all the constraints when Vi  a  p* i
    Vi  a holds. This can be done by demonstrating: V 2c  j 2
D  C  (V  a)  (V    p  p  2c ) ii i j i j 2
 (V  a)  (V    2c )  0, (A13) ij 2
C  B  (V    p  p  2c )  (p  c ) ii j i j 2 i 3
 (V    2c ) j 2
 (3a  V  2a(6a  V  2c  W)) ii 3 i
 (V    3a  V  2c ) ji 2
 2a(6a  V  2c  W)  0 (A14) i 3 i
(given W  V and V    V  a  V  a, ii j j i
V    3a  V  4a), ji
B  A  (p  c )  (V  a) ii i 3 i
 (3a  V  2a(6a  V  2c  W))  (V  a) ii 3 ii
 2a(6a  V  2c  W)  2a i 3 i
 2a  4a  V  2c  W i 3 i
 2a  2(a  c )  V  W  0, 3 ii (A15)
p    (3a  V  c  2a(6a  V  2c  W)) jj 3 j 3 j
 (V    2c   c ) j 23
 3a  (V  )  2c   V j 2 j
 2a(6a  V  2c  W)  0 j 3 j
(given Wj  Vj and    Vj  a, Vj
3a  (V  )  V  4a). jj
(A16)
When Vi  a      Vi  a, Equations (A13), (A14), (A15) and V 2c  j 2
(A16) demonstrate that the optimal interior solution also satisﬁes parameter p* i520  Chan, Wang, and Yang
conditions Ai  Bi  Ci  Di and pj   (that characterize situation 4). This
indicates that Equation (A12) is the local optimal solution for situation 4.
Situation 14. Situation 14 requires that Ci  Ai  Bi  Di and pj  .F r o m
Panel B of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in this
situation as:
V ap c ii 3 11 ˆˆ E()  (p) dV  (W) dV (A17) i L ii ii
p cV a 2a 2a i 3 i
and
V a j 1 ˆ E()  (V) dV iR i j
p c 2a j 3
p cp cV a j 3 i 3 i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV.  ii ii j
V aV ap c 2a 2a 2a ji i 3
(A18)
The optimization problem for Fi is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() . (A19) ii L i R 22 {p } i
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i  (2p  a  V  W  c )(p  3a  V  c ) ii i 3 jj 3 2 dp 8a i
 0. (A20)
Since:
p  3a  V  c  (p  c )  (V  a)  2a  2a  0, jj 3 j 3 j
(A21)IPO Pricing Strategies  521
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we have an interior solution:
1
p  (a  V  c  W). (A22) ii 3 i 2
Since:
2 dE ()1 i  (p  c  (V  a)  2a)  0 (A23) j 3 j 2 dp 4a i
(given pj  c3  Vj  a),
the solution is a local maximum. Similarly, we can derive that:
1
p  (a  V  c  W). (A24) jj 3 j 2
However, to prove that is the optimal solution for this situation, we also need p* i
to conﬁrm that satisﬁes all the constraints that characterize situation 14 when p* i
Vi  a     holds. This can be done by demonstrating: V 2c  j 2
1
D  B  (V  a)  (a  V  c  W)  c  0,  ii i i 3 i 3 2
(A25)
B  A  (p  c )  (V  a)  0, (A26) ii i 3 i
A  C  (V  a)  (V    p  p  2c )  0, (A27) ii i j i j 2
1
p    (a  V  c  W)  (V    2c   c )  0 ji 3 ij 23 2 (A28)
(given    Vj  a  Vi  a and    Vi  Wi). VV jj
When Vi  a     , Equations (A25), (A26), (A27), and (A28) V 2c  j 2
demonstrate that the optimal interior solution also satisﬁes parameter conditions p* i
Ci  Ai  Bi  Di and pj   that characterize situation 14. This indicates that
Equation (A23) is the local optimal solution for situation 14.522  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Situation 20. Situation 20 requires that Ai  Bi  Di  Ci and pj  .F r o m




p c i 3
ˆ V p pV a iij j 11 ˆˆ  (p) dV  (W) dV  ij ij ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a ji i j
p c i 3 11 ˆˆ dV  (W) dV (A29) ii i




p c j 3
ˆ V p pV a jji i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV  ii ii j ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a 2a ij j i
p cp cV a j 3 i 3 i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV.  ii ii j
V aV ap c 2a 2a 2a ji i 3
(A30)
The optimization problem for Fi is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() . (A31) ii L i R 22 {p } i
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i 22 2  {6a  2c  3p  4cp 4pp 3 i 3 ji j 2 dp 16a i
2  p  2(p  p)W  4V(p  c )  2V ji j i i j 3 i
 4a(c  4p  p  2W  V)}  0. (A32) 3 ij ii
We could derive a similar condition for Fj. Again, since the two ﬁrms have
symmetric pricing decisions and same value parameters, they should be priced the
same. Substituting pi  pj into Equation (A32), we obtain:IPO Pricing Strategies  523
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1 2 {(p  V  c  3a)  4a(3a  V  c  W)}  0. ii 3 i 3 i 2 8a
(A33)
Since 3a  Vi  c3  Wi  2a  Vi  c3  Wi  a  0, the interior solution
for Equation (A33) does exist. In addition, since pi  Vi  c3  3a  ((pi 
c3)  (Vi  a))  2a  0  2a  0, the interior solution is unique:
p  3a  V  c  2a(3a  V  c  W). (A34) ii 3 i 3 i
Since:
2 dE ()1 i  (8a  3p  2p  W)  0 (A35) ij i 2 dp 8a i
(given pi  c3  Vi  a)
the solution is a local maximum. Similarly, we can derive that:
p  3a  V  c  2a(3a  V  c  W). (A36) jj 3 j 3 j
However, to prove that is the optimal solution for this situation, we also need p* i
to conﬁrm that satisﬁes all the constraints that characterize situation 14 when p* i
   Vi  a holds. This can be done by demonstrating: V 2c  j 2
C  D  (V    2c )  (V  a)  0, (A37) ii j 2 i
D  B  (V  a)  (p  c ) ii i i 3
 2a  a  V  c  W  0, (A38) i 3 i
B  A  (p  c )  (V  a) ii i 3 i
 2a  2a  V  c  W  0, (A39) i 3 i
p    3a  (V  )  2c  jj 2
 V  2a(3a  V  c  W)  0 (A40) jj 3 j
(given    Vj  a and Wj  Vj). Vj524  Chan, Wang, and Yang
When    Vi  a, Equations (A37), (A38), (A39), and (A40) V 2c  j 2
demonstrate that the optimal interior solution also satisﬁes parameter conditions p* i
Ai  Bi  Di  Ci and pj   that characterize situation 20. This indicates that
Equation (A34) is the local optimal solution for situation 20.
Situations with a Corner Solution
We ﬁnd ﬁve situations with a corner solution, namely, situations 2, 6, 10, 12, and
18. For those situations, we will check if they are dominated by adjoining interior
situations.
Situation 2. This situation requires that Bi  Ai  Ci  Di and pj  .F r o m
Panel B of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in this
situation as:
V aV p p 2c  ij i j 2 1 ˆ E()  (p) dV  iL i i
V p p 2c  V a 2a ji j 2 i
ˆ V p pV a iij j 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (p) dV  (W) dV dV.  ij ij i ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a 2a ji i j
(A41)
and
V aV p p 2c  ji j i 2 1 ˆ E()  (V) dV  iR i j
V p p 2c  V a 2a ij i 2 j
ˆ V p pV a jji i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV.  ii ii j ˆ V aV p p 2a 2a 2a ij j i
(A42)
The optimization problem for Fi is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() . (A43) ii L i R 22 {p } iIPO Pricing Strategies  525
JRER  Vol. 31  N o . 4–2 0 0 9
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i 2  (8a  (p  p)(3p  p  2W) ij ij i 2 dp 16a i
 4a(2p  p  W)). (A44) ij i
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition for Fj is:
dE() 1 j 2  (8a  (p  p)(3p  p  2W) ji ji j 2 dp 16a j
 4a(2p  p  W)). (A45) ji j
From Equations (A44) and (A45), we know that when Vi  Vj and Wi  Wj, pi
must equal pj. This reduces Equation (A44) to dE(i)/dpi  1/4a (pi  2a 
Wi). Given pi  c3  Vi  a (i.e., pi  Vi  a  c3), this indicates:
dE()1 i  (3a  V  c  W)  0. (A46) i 3 i dp 4a i
Equation (A46) indicates that the expected payoff of Fi is an increasing function
of pi. Given the constraint Bi  Ai  Ci  Di and pj  , Equation (A46) suggests
that the optimal price must be at the point where Bi (or, pi  c3) is equal to its
upper limit Ai. Given this, it is clear that this optimal solution must also be the
point that is adjacent to the lower bound of another situation. It is clear that
situation 4 (where Ai  Bi  Ci  Di) is the adjoining situation. Since situation
4 has an interior solution, this corner solution must be dominated by the interior
solution.
Finally, we also need to check if the corner solution satisﬁes the constraints Bi 
Ai  Ci  Di and pj  . Note that Bi  Ai leads to pi  c3  Vi  a, hence pi
 Vi  a  c3    c3  . In other words, constraint pj   V 2c  j 2
is supported by the corner solution. In addition, the constraint Ai  Ci  Di is
satisﬁed when the parameter condition Vi  a      Vi  a holds. V 2c  j 2526  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Situation 6. Situation 6 requires that Ai  Ci  Bi  Di and pj  . From Panel
B of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in situation 6 as:
V ap c ii 3 11 ˆˆ E()  (p) dV  (W) dV (A47) i L ii ii
p cV a 2a 2a i 3 i
and
V a j 1 ˆ E()  (V) dV iR i j
p c 2a j 3
p cp cV a j 3 i 3 i 11 1 ˆˆ ˆ  (W) dV  (p) dV dV.  ii ii j
V aV ap c 2a 2a 2a ji i 3
(A48)
The optimization problem for Fi is to:
11
Max E()  E()  E() . (A49) ii L i R 22 {p } i
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i  (2p  a  V  W  c )(p  3a  V  c ). ii i 3 jj 3 2 dp 8a i
(A50)
It is easy to see that pj  3a  Vj  c3  (pj  c3)  (Vj  a)  2a  2a  0.
We also know that 2pi  a  Vi  Wi  c3  2(    c3)  V 2c  i 2
a  Vi  Wi  c3  ((    (a  Vi))  (    c3  Wi)  VV 4c  ii 2
0. This is true because when Ci  Bi,    pj  pi   pj  c3. V 2c  i 2
Given this:
dE() i  0. (A51)
dpi
Equation (A51) indicates that the expected payoff of Fi is a decreasing function
of pi. Given the constraint Ai  Ci  Bi  Di, Equation (A51) suggests that theIPO Pricing Strategies  527
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optimal price must be at the point where Bi (or, pi  c3) is equal to its lower limit
Ci. Given this, it is clear that this optimal solution must also be the point that is
adjacent to the upper bound of another situation. It is clear that situation 4 (where
Ai  Bi  Ci  Di) is the adjoining situation. Since situation 4 has an interior
solution, this corner solution must be dominated by the interior solution.
Finally, we also need to check if the corner solution satisﬁes the constraints Ai 
Bi  Ci  Di and pj  . We know that pi    c3     V 2c  V j 2 j
c3  . In addition, the constraint Ai  Ci  Di is satisﬁed when the 2c  2
parameter condition Vi  a      Vi  a holds. V 2c  j 2
Situations 10 and 12. Situation 10 requires that Bi  Ci  Ai  Di and pj  .
Situation 12 requires Ci  Bi  Ai  Di and pj  . Both situations require that
Bi, Ci  Ai  Min( )  . From Exhibit 4, we know that route [1] is the only ˆˆ VV ii
feasible outcome under this circumstance.
From Panel B of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in
these situations as:
111
E()  E()  E()  (p  V). ii L i R i i 222
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i  0. (A52)
dp 2 i
Equation (A52) indicates that the expected payoff of Fi for situations 10 and 12
is an increasing function of pi.
Given the constraint Bi  Ci  Ai  Di that is required for situation 10, Equation
(A52) suggests that the optimal price must be at the point where Bi (or, pi  c3)
is equal to its upper limit Ci. Given this, it is clear that this optimal solution must
also be the point that is adjacent to the lower bound of another situation. It is
clear that situation 12 (where Ci  Bi  Ai  Di) is the neighboring situation.
Since situation 12 has a corner solution, this corner solution of situation 10 must
be dominated by the corner solution of situation 12. Given the constraint Ci  Bi
 Ai  Di that is required for situation 12, Equation (A51) suggests that the
optimal price must be at the point where Bi (or, pi  c3) is equal to its upper limit
Ai. Therefore, it is clear that this optimal solution must also be the point that is
adjacent to the lower bound of another situation. It is clear that situation 14 (where
Ci  Ai  Bi  Di) is the adjoining situation. Since situation 14 has an interior
solution, this corner solution of situation 12 and hence the corner solution of
situation 10 must be dominated by the interior solution.528  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Finally, we also need to check if the corner solutions satisfy their constraints. In
situation 10, Bi  Ci leads to pi  c3    , hence pi    V 2c  V j 2 j
c3     c3  . In situation 12, Bi  Ai leads to pi  2c  V 2c  2 j 2
c3  a, hence pi  (  a)  c3     c3  . Consequently, ˆˆ VV V ii j
constraint pj   is supported by both corner solutions. The common constraint
Ci  Ai for both situations is satisﬁed when the parameter condition    Vj
 Vi  a holds. 2c  2
Situation 18. This situation requires Bi  Ai  Di  Ci and pj  . From Panel
B of Exhibit 4, we can write the expected payoff function of Fi in situation 18
as:
ˆ V aV p p i iij 1 ˆ E()  (p) dV  iL i j
V aV a 2a ij
V a j 11 ˆˆ  (W) dV dV  ij i ˆ V p p 2a 2a iij
(A53)
and
ˆ V aV p pV a jj j i i 11 ˆˆ E()  (W) dV  (p) dV  iR i i i i ˆ V aV aV p p 2a 2a i i jji
1 ˆ dV. j 2a (A54)
The ﬁrst-order condition for Fi is:
dE()1 i  (2p  p  a  W). (A55) ij i dp 2a i
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition for Fj is:
dE()1 j  (2p  p  a  W). (A56) ji j dp 2a j
From Equations (A55) and (A56), we know that when Vi  Vj and Wi  Wj, pi
must equal pj. This reduces Equation (A55) to dE(i)/dpi  1/4a (pi  2a 
Wi). Given pi  c3  Vi  a (i.e., pi  Vi  a  c3), this indicates:IPO Pricing Strategies  529
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dE()1 i  (2a  V  cW )  0. (A57) i 3 i dp 2a i
Equation (A57) indicates that the expected payoff of Fi is an increasing function
of pi. Given the constraint Bi  Ai  Di  Ci, Equation (A57) suggests that the
optimal price must be at the point where Bi (or, pi  c3) is equal to its upper limit
Ai. Given this, it is clear that this optimal solution must also be the point that is
adjacent to the lower bound of another situation. It is clear that situation 20 (where
Ai  Bi  Di  Ci) is the adjoining situation. Since situation 20 has an interior
solution, this corner solution must be dominated by the interior solution.
Finally, we also need to check if the corner solution satisﬁes the constraints Bi 
Ai  Di  Ci and pj  . We note that Bi  Ai leads to pi  c3  Vi  a.
Therefore, pi  Vi  a  c3    c3  . The constraint Di  V 2c  j 2
Ci is satisﬁed when the parameter condition Vi  a     holds. V 2c  j 2
Situations with Conflicting Constraints
Nine situations have problems meeting all the constraints imposed upon them. For
the purpose of discussion, we divide these nine situations into two groups.
Situations 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19. These eight situations have the common
requirements that Bi  Di and pj  . Since the constraint pj   indicates pi 
, pi     c3. Therefore, we have: V 2c  j 2
ˆ p  c  V    2c   Max(V) (A58) i 3 j 2 i
Equation (A58) implies that Bi  Di. Since Bi  Di and Bi  Di cannot exist
simultaneously, these 8 situations do not exist in reality.
Situation 21. This situation requires that Ai  Di  Bi  Ci and pj   (and
Aj  Dj  Bj  Cj and pi  ). Since the constraint pj   indicates pi  ,
pi     c3. Thus, we have: V 2c  j 2
p  c  V    2c   V    2c , (A59) i 3 j 2 j 2
Equation (A59) implies that Bi  Ci. Since Bi  Ci and Bi  Ci cannot exist
simultaneously, this situation does not exist in reality.530  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Situations with a Deadweight Loss
We ﬁnd seven situations with deadweight loss, namely, situations 7, 8, 15, 16, 22,
23, and 24. There is no optimal solution within each of these.
Situations 8, 16, 22, and 24. These four situations have the common requirements
that Bi  Di and pj  . With these two constraints, Panel A of Exhibit 4 indicates
that three routes are not feasible for the investor. Since Bi  Di  Max( )  , ˆˆ VV ii
routes [1] and [2] are not feasible solutions for the investor. Since pj  , the
condition of route [3] in Exhibit 4 cannot be satisﬁed. Consequently, the only
feasible route is route [4]. Since the payoff of route [4] is the downside payoff
Wi for both ﬁrms, the two ﬁrms will set their prices at a level that allow them to
avoid the four situations. In other words, in reality, there is no optimal price in
the four situations.
Situations 7, 15, and 23. These three situations have the common requirements
that Di  Bi and pj  . With these two constraints, Panel A of Exhibit 4 indicates
that three routes are not feasible for the investor. Since Bi  Di  Max( )  , ˆˆ VV ii
routes [1] and [2] are not feasible solutions for the investor. Since pj  , the
condition of route [4] in Exhibit 4 cannot be satisﬁed. Consequently, the only
feasible route is route [3]. From Exhibit 4, we know that the investor will
immediately reject both offers and the payoffs of the two ﬁrms are  Wi and [3]  iL
 Vi, respectively. The expected payoff will be E(i)  E(i)L  E(i)R
[3] 11 ––  iR 22
 (Wi  Vi). This indicates a positive expected deadweight loss Vi  (Wi  1 1 –– 2 2
Vi)Vi  (Vi  Wi). Consequently, both ﬁrms will set their prices at a suitable 1 – 2
level to avoid taking a negative payoff. In other words, in reality, there is no
optimal price in the three situations.
Summary of All 24 Situations
There are a total of four types of outcomes for the 24 situations. First, situations
4, 14, and 20 have an interior solution. Second, situations 2, 6, 10, 12, and 18
have a corner solution. However, those corner solutions are dominated by the
adjoining interior solutions. Third, situations 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, and 21
have conﬂicting boundary constraints that cannot simultaneously hold. These
situations do not exist. Fourth, situations 8, 16, 22, 24, 7, 15, and 23 suffer positive
expected deadweight loss. Firms will deﬁnitely set the price at a right level to
avoid those situations. In reality, these situations do not exist.
Exhibit 6 summarizes the results. First, when parameter condition Ai  Ci  Di
(that is, Vi  a      Vi  a) holds, there are eight possible V 2c  j 2
outcomes (situations 1 to 8). It is clear that the global optimum within these eight
situations is the interior solution in situation 4 (  3a  Vi  c3  p* i
which is proven to dominate the corner solutions of 2a(6a  V  2c  W)), i 3 iIPO Pricing Strategies  531
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situations 2 and 6. Second, when parameter condition Ci  Ai (that is, Vi  a 
   ) holds, there are 8 possible outcomes (situations 9 to 16). It is V 2c  j 2
clear that the global optimum within these eight situations is the interior solution
in situation 14 (  (a  Vi  c3  Wi), which is proven to dominate the 1 – p* i 2
corner solutions of situations 10 and 12. Finally, when parameter condition Ci 
Di (that is,    Vi  a) holds, there are eight possible outcomes V 2c  j 2
(situations 17 to 24). It is clear that the global optimum within these eight
situations is the interior solution in situation 20 (  3a  Vi  c3  p* i
which is proven to dominate the corner solution of 2a(3a  V  c  W)), i 3 i
situation 18. It is also clear that these three cases represent the comprehensive
solution set for ﬁrms’ IPO pricing strategies.
Comparative Static Analysis
When  Vi  3a  c3  (Case 1), we D* p* 2a(6a  V  2c  W) ii i 3 i
obtain:
	D*2 a i  1  0
	c 2a(2a  4a  V  2c  W) 3 i 3 i
(given 4a  Vi  2c3  Wi),
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i 22      0 (given c  c  ), 31 	c 	c 	c 	c 13 1 3
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i    2c  0, 1 	 	c 	 	c 33
	D* a i  0,
	W 2a(6a  V  2c  W) i i 3 i
	D*1 2 a  V  2c  W ii 3 i  3 
	a 2a(6a  V  2c  W) i 3 i
18a(6a  V  2c  W)  (12a  V  2c  W) i 3 ii 3 i

2a(6a  V  2c  W) i 3 i
 0 (A60)532  Chan, Wang, and Yang
When  Vi  (Vi  a  c3  Wi) (Case 2), we obtain: 1 – D* p* ii 2
	D*1 i  0,
	c 2 3
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i 22      0 (given c  c  ), 31 	c 	c 	c 	c 13 1 3
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i   2c  0, 1 	 	c 	 	c 33
	D*1 i  0,
	W 2 i
	D*1 i  0. (A61)
	a 2
When  Vi  3a  c3  (Case 3), we obtain: D* p*2 a(3a  V  c  W) ii i 3 i
	D* a i  1  0
	c a(a  2a  V  c  W) 3 i 3 i
(given 2a  Vi  c3  Wi),
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i 22      0 (given c  c  ), 31 	c 	c 	c 	c 13 1 3
	D* 	D* 	c 	D* ii 3 i    2c  0, 1 	 	c 	 	c 33
	D* a i  0,
	W a(3a  V  c  W) i i 3 i
	D*6 a  V  c  W ii 3 i  3 
	a a(3a  V  c  W) i 3 i
9a(3a  V  c  W)  (6a  V  c  W) i 3 ii 3 i
 0.
a(3a  V  c  W) i 3 i
(A62)
The signs for each variable (c3, c1, , Wi, and a) are consistent among the three
cases. End of Proof.IPO Pricing Strategies  533
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 Proof for Proposition 2
When analyzing the joint payoffs of the ﬁrm and the underwriter, it is easy to see
that the ﬁrm commitment contract differs from the best-efforts contract only in
the downside payoff for the joint party. That is, all we need to do is to replace
Wi with  
i in all the equations. The investor’s decision rules reported in Mi
Exhibit 3 and the constraints for each of the 24 situations reported in Exhibit 5
remain the same.
Following exactly the approach for deriving Proposition 1, we can derive
the pricing rule for a ﬁrm commitment contract. Actually, all results are similar
to that derived under the best-efforts contract, except that Wi is replaced with
 
i. The comparative static analysis results can be easily derived. End of Mi
Proof.
 Proof for Proposition 3
Since the joint payoffs (for the ﬁrm and the underwriter) of the two underwriting
contracts (best-efforts and ﬁrm commitment) differ only in the downside payoff,
the contract selection is actually a function of the downside payoff i, where i
 Wi under a best-efforts contract and i  
i under a ﬁrm commitment Mi
contract.
Case Vi  a    V2 c  j 2
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that when ﬁrms observe Vi  a 
   , the optimal price is  (a  Vi  c3  i). Substituting 1 – V 2c  p* j 2 i 2
into the ﬁrm’s expected payoff function in Equation (A19), we derive: p* i
1 32 2 E()  [7a  a(5c  18c (  V)  13(  V)) i 33 ii ii 2 64a




1 22  [43a  3(c  V  )  26a(c  V  )  8ac ] 3 ii 3 ii 3 2 64a
2 11 3 4 0 2  3 a  (c  V  )  a  8ac   	 3 ii 3 2 64a 33
2 17 4 0 2  3 a  (2a  c  V  )  a  8ac   	 3 ii 3 2 64a 33
2 1 7 40 1 22  3 a  a  8ac  [3a  8ac ]  	 33 22 64a 33 6 4 a
 0. (A64)
Given that two contracts differ only in the downside payoff, Equation (A64)
indicates that a contract with a higher downside payoff will increase the joint
payoff of the ﬁrm and underwriter. Consequently, a ﬁrm will select a ﬁrm
commitment contract if  
i  Wi, select a best-efforts contract if  
i  MM ii
Wi, and be indifferent to these two contracts if  
i  Wi. Mi
Case    V i  a V2 c  j 2
When ﬁrms observe    Vi  a, the optimal price is  3a  V 2c  p* j 2 i
Vi  c3  Substituting into the ﬁrm’s expected 2a(3a  V  c  W). p* i 3 ii
payoff function in Equation (A31), we derive:
1 2 E()  [21a  (c  V  )(V    c  4) i 3 ii ii 3 i 2a
 2a(5V  6  5c  6)], ii 3 i (A65)IPO Pricing Strategies  535
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where i  Correspondingly, a(3a  V  c  ). i 3 i
2 dE()1  ii 2  3   3a    	 ii d a a ii
1 22  [3a  3,a   ] ii 2 a
2 13 3 2    a  a  0. (A66)   	 i 2 a 24
As in the previous case, a contract with a higher downside payoff will increase
the joint payoff of the ﬁrm and underwriter. Consequently, a ﬁrm will select a
ﬁrm commitment contract if  
i  Wi, select a best-efforts contract if  MM ii

i  Wi, and be indifferent to these two contracts if  
i  Wi. Mi
Case Vi  a      V i  a V2 c  j 2
When ﬁrms observe Vi  a      Vi  a, the optimal price is V 2c  j 2
 3a  Vi  c3  The total derivative dE(i)/ p* 2a(6a  V  2c  ). ii 3 i
di can be decomposed as:
dE() 	E() 	E() 	p* iii i  , (A67)
d 	 	p* 	 ii i i
Where:
	E()1 i 22  [3a  (V  c  p*) i 3 i 2 	 8a i
 2a(V    2c   p*  c  2V)] j 2 i 3 i
1 22  [3a  (V  c  p*) i 3 i 2 8a
 2a(V  a  p*  c  2V)] ii 3 i
1 2  [(a  c  V  p*)  2ac ]  0; (A68) 3 ii 3 2 8a
	p* aa 1 i    0.
	 2 2a(6a  V  2c  ) 2a  2a i i 3 i
(A69)536  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Given Equations (A67), (A68), and (A69), it is clear that if 	E(i)/  0, we 	p* i
must have dE(i)/di  0.
However, even if 	E(i)/	  0, we can still prove that dE(i)/di  0. To see p* i
this, we know if 	E(i)/	  0, since 	 /	i  we can rewrite Equation 1 – p* p*, ii 2
(A67) as:
dE() 	E() 	E() 	p* 	E()1 	E() iii ii i    (A70)
d 	 	p* 	 	 2 	p* ii i i i i
1 2  [9a  2a(2(V    2c ) j 2 2 16a
 3V    c ) ii 3
 (V  c  p*)(p*  c  V  2)] i 3 ii 3 ii
1 2  [9a  2a(2(V  a)  3V    c ) ii i 3 2 16a
 (V  c  p*)(p*  c  V  2)] i 3 ii 3 ii
1 2  [2a(2a  (V    c ))  a ii 3 2 16a
 (V  c  p*)(p*  c  V  2)] i 3 ii 3 ii
1 2  [a  (V  c  p*) (p* c  V  2)]. i 3 ii3 ii 2 16a
(A71)
Since  c3  Vi  2i  0 is always true, if Vi  c3   0, Equation p* p* i i
(88) must hold and dE(i)/di  0. However, if Vi  c3  0( w h i c hc a n p* i
be transformed into 1.5a  Vi  i  2c3), we can still show that dE(i)/di 
0 if we can prove  c3  Vi  2i  3a and 0  Vi  c3   a/3. p* p* ii
First, to prove  c3  Vi  2i  3a is equivalent to prove p* i
 6a  2c3  2Vi  2i. We know: 2a(6a  V  2c  ) i 3 i
2 (6a  2c  2V  2)  2a(6a  V  2c  ) 3 ii i 3 i
22  [2(3a  (V    c ))  0.5a]  2ac  6.25a ii 33
22  [2(1.5a)  0.5a]  2ac  6.25a 3
(given that 1.5a  Vi  i  2c3 for this situation)
 2ac  0. 3 (A72)IPO Pricing Strategies  537
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Given Equation (A72), 2a(6a  Vi  2c3  i)  (6a  2c3  2Vi  2i)2 must
hold and  c3  Vi  2i  3a is true. p* i
Second, to prove Vi  c3   a/3 is equivalent to prove a  10 –– p* i 3
After several transformations, this is equivalent to 2a(6a  V  2c  ). i 3 i
prove Vi  i  2c  a, which is intuitively true. Thus, 0  c3  Vi  4 – p* 9 i
2i  3a and 0  Vi  c3   a/3 hold in this situation. We can now p* i
rewrite Equation (A71) as:
dE()1 i 2  [a  (V  c  p*)(p*  c  V  2)] i 3 ii 3 ii 2 d 16a i
11 2  a  a  3a  0. 	 2 16a 3
(A73)
We now prove that dE(i)/di  0 holds in this case. Given that the best-efforts
and ﬁrm commitment contracts differ only in the downside payoff, Equation (A73)
indicates that a contract with the higher downside payoff will increase the joint
payoff of the ﬁrm and underwriter. Consequently, a ﬁrm should select a ﬁrm
commitment contract if  
i  Wi, select a best-efforts contract if  
i  MM ii
Wi, and be indifferent to these two contracts if  
i  Wi. Mi
End of Proof.
 Endnotes
1 We obtained this information from an article written by Jay Ritter titled ‘‘Some Factoids
about the 2006 IPO Market,’’ which is available on his website, http://bear.cba.uﬂ.
edu/ritter.
2 For a partial list of the literature dealing with the ﬁrst explanation, see Baron (1982),
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), Cornelli and
Goldreich (2001), Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002), and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2002). For a partial list of the literature dealing with the second explanation, see
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996), Busaba,
Benveniste, and Guo (2001), and Sherman and Titman (2002). For a partial list of the
literature dealing with the third explanation, see Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt
and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989, 1996), and Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993).
3 For a partial list of the studies in these areas, see Tinic (1988), Ritter (1991), Welch
(1992), Brennan and Franks (1997), Stoughton and Zechner (1998), Aggarwal (2000),
Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), Fishe (2002), Lowry and Shu (2002), Field and
Sheehan (2004), Cook, Kieschnick, and Van Ness (2006), Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh
(2006), and Chen and Wilhelm (2008).
4 To explain the dot-com bubble in the IPO market, Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004),
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), James and Karceski (2006), and Houston, James, and538  Chan, Wang, and Yang
Karceski (2006) stress the dark side of the institutional arrangements that boost the
underwriter’s proﬁt, affect analyst coverage, and increase the personal gains of
executives of the IPO ﬁrms.
5 See Chan, Stohs, and Wang (2001) and Chan, Erickson, and Wang (2002) for empirical
evidence on REIT IPOs, Muscarella (1988) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) for empirical
evidence on MLP IPOs, and Peavy (1990) for empirical evidence on mutual fund IPOs.
6 We assume that the two ﬁrms simultaneously make offers to the market so that we do
not need to model who should move ﬁrst, although, in reality, later movers have the
advantage to observe the prices of the earlier movers before they make decisions. The
one share assumption is not necessary for the model development, but simpliﬁes our
model presentation greatly.
7 Our result is not sensitive to the assumption that each ﬁrm knows its rival’s stock value.
If we assume that ﬁrms do not know each other’s value, the qualitative conclusions of
the model are substantially the same. All we need to do is to replace a known value
with an expected value in the analyses, which does not affect the rest of the analyses.
8 The prices offered by the ﬁrms are the IPO offering prices, not the ranges of preliminary
prices offered during the road shows.
9 Here we implicitly assume that the search will yield information that can justify the
search cost. We can allow the investor to choose whether or not to conduct the ﬁrst
search. However, this will make the model more complicated while not generating more
implications.
10 The key assumption we need here is that the search must reﬁne the information in such
a way that the post-search is on average closer to the intrinsic value Vk than the pre- ˆ Vk
search value Given this, it does not matter if the mean of differs from (or is equal ˆ V . V kk
to) Vk.
11 Alternatively, we can treat the search costs c1 and c2 as sunk costs that cannot be
recovered. The key is that the investor will incur more costs when searching for other
investment opportunities.
12 Learning can be achieved due to the high correlations of future cash ﬂows among ﬁrms
with a similar background. See Foerster and Karolyi (1999) for a good discussion on
this issue. However, Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) ﬁnd that personal experience is
overweighted when compared to rational Baysian learning. Wang, Chan, and Erickson
(1995), Wang, Erickson, Gau, and Chan (1995), Chan, Leung, and Wang (2005), and
Daniels and Phillips (2007) report the relationship between REIT performance and the
attention the stock receives from the capital market. Li and Wang (1995) and Ling (2005)
discuss the predictability of REIT stock returns and commercial real estate returns,
respectively.
13 The IPO withdrawal rate remained high during the best years for IPOs. Ljungqvist and
Wilhelm (2003) report that the IPO withdrawal rate was around 25% during the 1996–
2000 period. Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001) suggest that an important motivation
of going public is to establish image and publicity in the product market. Given this
motivation, a failed IPO will be very costly to a ﬁrm. Edelen and Kadlec (2005) also
suggest that rational issuers select an offer price that weighs the beneﬁt of higher
proceeds against the cost of forgone surplus if the offer fails.
14 It can be argued that the payoff to the investor should be c1  c2 because the investor
will not search and there is no learning. However, our result is the same either way.
The c1  c3 speciﬁcation makes the presentation more manageable.IPO Pricing Strategies  539
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15 Note that we assume that the intrinsic value of the stock Vbx (x  i, j) follows a uniform
distribution U[  ,  ]. VV xx
16 This 24-situation scenario assumes that ﬁrms will use the same optimal price strategies
and will not deliberately play games against their rivals (which will lead a ﬁrm to make
a decision that deviates from the optimal one). In other words, as we mentioned before,
we assume that ﬁrms are symmetric in making pricing decisions. If we allow the rival
ﬁrms to play games, a ﬁrm with a 50% chance of being searched ﬁrst needs to consider
2 4*2 4 576 possible situations.
17 See Ling and Ryngaert (1997) for a good discussion on the change of REIT structure
during the period.
18 It should noted that a  0.05V means that investors’ judgments could differ within 10%
of the ﬁrm’s value. This is quite reasonable, at least in the product (or property) market.
We frequently observe that in a sealed bid auction, the range of the bids is within 10%
of the mean of the bids. This happens despite the fact that all the parties involved are
knowledgeable and with similar information.
19 For a discussion on IPO waves and the associated return patterns, see Pastor and Pietro
(2006).
20 We stress again that this conclusion assumes that the ﬁrm’s perceived intrinsic value is
independent of the expected aftermarket stock price. The ﬁrm will, however, treat the
expected high aftermarket price as a windfall gain if the IPO is successful. Otherwise,
this conclusion will not hold, at least within our model framework.
21 See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) for empirical evidence related to the private beneﬁts
of listing.
22 We know that we miss a signiﬁcant part of IPO literature by making this assumption.
However, our purpose in this section is to demonstrate that the implications of our model
still hold with a ﬁrm commitment contract. We will not be able to examine the
interactions between the issuer and the underwriter.
23 In the best-efforts case, we assume that the investor will conduct the search after
observing the offering prices. In this ﬁrm commitment case, we can change the
assumption to one in which the investor conducts the search before observing the
offering prices. The result is the same.
24 Implicitly, we assume the underwriting costs to be the same across different contracts.
In practice, Menon and Williams (1991) show that a ﬁrm commitment contract is more
expensive than a best-efforts contract due to the need to hire more credible auditors.
25 However, it should be noted that the underwriter and the issuers can collude to maximize
their joint payoff only when the expected is the same as the intrinsic value of the Mi
ﬁrm V that they both agree on. When the expected differs from V, the objectives of Mi
the underwriter and the issuer cannot be the same and our analyses (based on the
maximization of the joint payoff) should not be applied to those cases.
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